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INTRODUCTION 
In 2010, the pharmaceutical industry was crowned “the biggest defrauder of the 
federal government,” as it surpassed the defense industry in False Claims Act1 
recoveries for the first time in history.2 This dubious distinction is largely due to the 
illegal promotional activities of pharmaceutical manufacturers, such as distributing 
information on unapproved uses of their drugs and paying kickbacks to doctors to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 * Assistant Professor of Law, Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of 
Law. B.S., University of Illinois; J.D., University of Michigan Law School. The author 
would like to thank Ellen Podgor, Kathleen Boozang, Kevin Outterson, Sandra Johnson, 
Thomas Greaney, Robert Gatter, Victor Romero, and Kit Kinports for comments on earlier 
drafts of this Article. The author would also like to thank the participants of the SLU Health 
Law Scholars Workshop, the Lutie A. Lytle Black Women Law Professors Conference, the 
Delaware Valley, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia Feminist Law Teachers 
Conference, and members of the faculty of Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School 
of Law for attending a presentation on this Article. For research assistance, the author would 
like to thank Tara Dittamo, Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law Class of 
2011. The author is appreciative of Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of 
Law’s financial support during the writing of this Article. 
 1. 18 U.S.C. § 287 (2006). 
 2. SAMMY ALMASHAT, CHARLES PRESTON, TIMOTHY WATERMAN & SIDNEY WOLF, 
PUBLIC CITIZEN, RAPIDLY INCREASING CRIMINAL AND CIVIL MONETARY PENALTIES AGAINST 
THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: 1991 TO 2010, at 12 (2010), 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/ rapidlyincreasingcriminalandcivilpenalties.pdf. One of 
the authors of the report, Sidney Wolfe, MD, is a member of the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration’s Drug Safety and Risk Management Advisory Committee. See Drug Safety 
and Risk Management Advisory Committee Roster, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. (Sept. 29, 
2011), http://www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/Drugs/ Drug 
SafetyandRiskManagementAdvisoryCommittee/ucm094892.htm.  
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induce them to prescribe those drugs.3 The large recoveries are due in part to the 
fact that the government has put the marketing practices of large pharmaceutical 
companies, like Pfizer, under a microscope. The government spends years 
investigating and building cases against pharmaceutical manufacturers that engage 
in illegal promotional activities to market their drugs but does not prosecute them. 
Instead, the government enters into Corporate Integrity Agreements (CIAs) with 
pharmaceutical giants. By entering into these civil administrative settlements, the 
pharmaceutical manufacturers are able to avoid the collateral consequences of 
criminal conviction. Importantly, if a pharmaceutical manufacturer enters into a 
CIA, the manufacturer will not be excluded from participation in federal health care 
programs, such as Medicare and Medicaid,4 as they would upon conviction in most 
cases. Medicare and Medicaid are significant sources of revenue for pharmaceutical 
manufacturers. In return for remaining eligible for Medicare and Medicaid 
reimbursements, the manufacturer pays the government a large fine and agrees to 
structural changes that are designed to prevent future marketing violations.  
The CIA seems like a reasonable solution to the problem of illegal promotional 
activities because it employs a cooperative approach to compliance, but its use has 
not led to demonstrable reductions in health care fraud. In part, this is because the 
government has entered into multiple CIAs with some manufacturers, like Pfizer, 
rather than seeking exclusion of those manufacturers that violate existing CIAs. 
Thus, the message to manufacturers is that, as long as they are willing to pay large 
fines and enact more compliance measures, the government will not exclude them 
from Medicare and Medicaid, no matter how egregious the violation. While the 
settlement amounts are often eye-popping—Pfizer settled for $2.3 billion5—the 
reality is that these settlements are a small portion of overall profits. Nevertheless, 
the government touts these settlements in the media as proof that they are tough on 
health care fraud and abuse.6  
                                                                                                                 
 
 3. ALMASHAT ET AL., supra note 2, at 18 (“From 1991 through 2005, unlawful 
promotion constituted only 16 percent of all [health care fraud] violations, comprising only 
$516 million in financial penalties. Over the past five years (2006–2010), unlawful 
promotion came to comprise over half (53 percent) of all violations, totaling at least $3.3 
billion in financial penalties, a six-fold increase in financial penalties for this violation 
compared with the previous fifteen years. In comparison, total financial penalties for all 
violations increased just three-fold over this same time period.”). 
 4. This Article uses Medicare and Medicaid as short hand for all federal health care 
programs. A federal health care program is defined as any plan or program that provides 
health benefits, whether directly, through insurance, or otherwise, which is funded directly, 
in whole or in part, by the U.S. government or a state health care program. 42 U.S.C. § 
1320a-7b(f). The most significant federal health care programs are Medicare, Medicaid, 
Tricare, and the Veterans programs.  
 5. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Justice Department 
Announces Largest Health Care Fraud Settlement in Its History: Pfizer to Pay $2.3 Billion 
for Fraudulent Marketing (Sept. 2, 2009), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/ 
2009pres/09/20090902a.html. 
 6. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bristol-Myers Squibb to Pay More Than 
$515 Million to Resolve Allegations of Illegal Drug Marketing and Pricing (Sept. 28, 2007), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/September/07_civ_782.html; Press Release, 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Eli Lilly and Company to Pay U.S. $36 Million Relating to Off-Label 
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The ultimate question is why is the government complicit in schemes to thwart 
the statutory remedy of exclusion? Unfortunately, the alternative—exclusion of the 
manufacturer from participation in Medicare and Medicaid—has devastating 
consequences that spill over to innocent patients, employees, and stockholders. Not 
only does the impact of the exclusion hit innocent third parties, but its imposition 
on the manufacturer substantially outweighs the harm the manufacturer inflicts 
through its improper marketing practices. The penalty for improperly marketing 
one drug is blanket exclusion, or exclusion of all drugs produced by that 
manufacturer, from Medicare and Medicaid. It is the government’s unwillingness 
to harm innocent third parties and its reluctance to impose a disproportionate 
penalty on drug manufacturers that leads them to CIAs. Thus, the real problem is 
not that the government uses CIAs—it is that the government does not have 
penalties of increasing severity to impose in place of exclusion. If the choice is 
simply between a CIA and exclusion, the government will choose the CIA each 
time to spare innocent third parties.  
Despite the government’s compromise practice of using CIAs instead of the 
exclusion remedy, the government has been sharply criticized for targeting 
pharmaceutical manufacturers that are marketing their drugs by distributing truthful 
scientific and medical information on unapproved uses of the drugs.7 That criticism 
is not without merit. Unfortunately, however, that criticism clouds the discussion of 
the appropriate remedy when the pharmaceutical manufacturer has engaged in more 
egregious illegal marketing practices, such as misrepresenting the safety and 
efficacy of an approved drug for an unapproved use or the payment of kickbacks to 
health care providers. The problem lies in the fact that the government has 
employed a one-size-fits-all approach to illegal promotional practices, without 
regard to the seriousness of the offense or the culpability of the offender. Whether 
the marketing activities involve truthful or untruthful promotion, the remedy is a 
CIA. Whether the pharmaceutical manufacturer is a first time or fifth time offender 
of the marketing rules, the remedy is a CIA. With so much emphasis in the 
literature on the injustice of prohibiting truthful promotion, there has been a lack of 
                                                                                                                 
Promotion (Dec. 21, 2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2005/December/ 
05_civ_685.html; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Merck to Pay More than $650 
Million to Resolve Claims of Fraudulent Price Reporting and Kickbacks (Feb. 7, 2008), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/ February/08_civ_094.html.  
 7. See, e.g., Margaret Gilhooley, Drug Safety and Commercial Speech: Television 
Advertisements and Reprints on Off-Label Uses, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 845 (2010) (arguing 
that the Food and Drug Administration cannot lawfully restrict truthful off-label promotion 
when those claims are widely accepted and reimbursable under federal health care 
programs); Ralph F. Hall & Robert J. Berlin, When You Have a Hammer Everything Looks 
Like a Nail: Misapplication of the False Claims Act to Off-Label Promotion, 61 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 653 (2006) (arguing that the False Claims Act should not apply to truthful off-
label promotional activities); Aaron S. Kesselheim, Off-Label Drug Use and Promotion: 
Balancing Public Health Goals and Commercial Speech, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 225 (2011) 
(arguing for the development of a scaled regulation model based on biological principles); 
John E. Osborn, Can I Tell You The Truth? A Comparative Perspective on Regulating Off-
Label Scientific and Medical Information, 10 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 299, 307 
(2010) (arguing that “communicating truthful, non-misleading scientific and medical 
information supports sound medical practice and should not subject companies to civil or 
criminal liability”).  
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concern with crafting the best remedy for pharmaceutical manufacturers that violate 
the law by blatantly misrepresenting the safety and efficacy of their drugs or 
providing illegal kickbacks. Thus, this Article fills an overlooked gap in the 
literature by critically examining the use of CIAs to resolve cases where 
pharmaceutical manufacturers engage in illegal and untruthful promotional 
activities.  
This Article argues that neither the exclusion of manufacturers from Medicare 
and Medicaid nor the use of CIAs coupled with large fines is an effective deterrent 
for pharmaceutical manufacturers that repeatedly engage in illegal marketing 
activities to promote their drugs. This Article assesses the alternatives to exclusion 
and CIAs and evaluates whether they may be effective remedies for illegal 
promotional activities. Part II of this Article surveys the statutory and regulatory 
framework for pursuing illegal marketing activities and critically examines the 
marketing activities and motives of pharmaceutical manufacturers. Part III 
examines deterrence theory and uses Pfizer as a repeat offender case study to 
scrutinize the government’s use of CIAs to settle cases involving untruthful 
promotional activities. It argues that CIAs fail to deter drug manufacturers from 
engaging in illegal promotional practices because the penalty imposed by and the 
cost of compliance with the CIA are significantly lower than the profits that a 
pharmaceutical company can obtain by illegally marketing its drugs. Further, the 
government’s willingness to enter into multiple CIAs with repeat offenders of the 
marketing rules rather than exclude them from Medicare and Medicaid 
substantially diminishes the ability of CIAs to deter illegal promotional activities. 
Part IV argues that there are viable alternatives to be used in place of or in 
conjunction with CIAs, such as funding clinical trials, compulsory licensing, 
corporate officer liability, and targeted exclusion, that would be more effective 
deterrents for repeat offenders. Each of these remedies could be used to increase the 
severity of punishment when a one-time offender becomes a repeat offender. This 
Article concludes that these proposed measures would be more successful than 
CIAs at increasing compliance and enforcing integrity in drug promotion.  
I. BACKGROUND 
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates the introduction of 
prescription drugs into commerce.8 Manufacturers that wish to introduce a new 
                                                                                                                 
 
 8. Congress established the FDA “to protect consumers from the dangers of fraudulent, 
impure, or mislabeled substances.” STEPHEN J. CECCOLI, PILL POLITICS: DRUGS AND THE FDA 
3 (2004). In 1938, Congress passed the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 
which required drug manufacturers to demonstrate that a drug was safe for use before the 
manufacturer could sell the drug on the market. Id. In 1962, Congress passed the Kefauver-
Harris Amendments, which required drug manufacturers to demonstrate efficacy as well as 
safety for each of a drug’s intended uses. Id. at 77–78. Congress passed the Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act, 
in 1984. Id. at 129–30. The Hatch-Waxman Act gave the FDA the power to accelerate 
approval for new drug applications for generic drugs, thereby reducing the cost of 
manufacturing and marketing generic drugs. Id. at 130. It also increased the patent term for 
brand-name drugs. Id. at 13. In 1987, Congress passed the Prescription Drug Marketing Act, 
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drug into the market must submit a New Drug Application (NDA) along with 
scientific evidence that demonstrates the drug’s safety and efficacy for a specified 
purpose.9 In turn, the FDA either approves or rejects the particular drug for the 
applied-for use. The FDA considers both patient safety and the potential benefit 
from the proposed use when approving or rejecting an NDA. At bottom, the FDA 
must decide whether the new drug is sufficiently effective for the proposed use 
relative to the safety risks of the drug.10 “In other words, the approval standard is 
medical benefits versus medical risks.”11 In some cases, the NDA may seek 
approval for several uses, but the FDA rejects the drug as unsafe for all but one or 
two proposed uses.12 Therefore, a drug may be declared “safe” for marketing for a 
                                                                                                                 
which prohibited counterfeit, misbranded, substandard, subpotent, ineffective, or expired 
drugs. FDA, REGULATORY INFORMATION, available at http://www.fda.gov/Regulatory 
Information/Legislation/FederalFoodDrugandCosmeticActFDCAct/SignificantAmendmentst
otheFDCAct/PrescriptionDrugMarketingActof1987/default.htm. Finally, in 1997, Congress 
passed the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA), which explicitly 
permits doctors to prescribe drugs for off-label uses. 21 U.S.C. § 396. At the same time, 
however, the FDAMA prohibits drug manufacturers from promoting drugs for off-label uses 
unless the manufacturer resubmits the drug to the FDA for testing and approval. CECCOLI, 
supra, at 4.  
 9. Before a pharmaceutical manufacturer can submit an NDA to the FDA, the 
manufacturer must put the drug through several phases of testing. CECCOLI, supra note 8, at 
165–68.  
  In the preclinical testing phase, the pharmaceutical laboratory tests the drug 
compound using animal and laboratory studies to evaluate the safety, potential toxicity, and 
biological activity. Id. Preclinical testing lasts on average from three to four years. Id. After 
the pharmaceutical manufacturer has concluded preclinical testing on a new compound, the 
manufacturer may file an investigational new drug application with the FDA. Id. The FDA 
then has thirty days to reject the application. Id. If the FDA does not reject the application, 
the manufacturer may begin testing on humans. Id. In Phase I trials, the compound is tested 
on a group of twenty to eighty healthy volunteers. In Phase I, researchers attempt to establish 
the safety and toxicity of the compound as well as monitor the drug’s behavior in the body. 
Id. The researchers also settle on drug indications and dosage requirements during Phase I. 
Researchers ordinarily spend one year on Phase I clinical testing. Id. In Phase II, researchers 
conduct controlled studies on 100–300 subjects who are suffering from the disease under 
consideration. Id. The researchers assess the effectiveness of the drug and any possible side 
effects. Phase II typically takes two years to complete. Id. In Phase III, researchers perform 
controlled testing on 1000–3000 patients who, like in Phase II, are afflicted with the disease 
under consideration. Id. In this phase, the researchers’ goals are to determine the long-term 
effects in the body from drug use and to establish the efficacy of the drug. Id. In addition, 
researchers perfect the dosage requirements and monitor long-term side effects and adverse 
reactions from the drug. Id. Typically, testing in Phase III takes the form of randomized 
double-blind, placebo-controlled clinical investigations where neither the researcher nor the 
subject knows where the placebo lies. Id. Generally, Phase III takes three years. Id.  
 10. Bruce Patsner, Marketing Approval Versus Cost of New Medical Technologies in the 
Era of Comparative Effectiveness: CMS, Not FDA, Will Be the Primary Player, 3 J. HEALTH 
& LIFE SCI. L. 38, 54 (2010). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Joel Lexchin, The Pharmaceutical Industry and the Pursuit of Profit, in THE POWER 
OF PILLS: SOCIAL, ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN DRUG DEVELOPMENT, MARKETING, AND 
PRICING 11, 13 (Jillian Claire Cohen, Patricia Illingworth & Udo Schüklenk eds., 2006). 
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specific use, but not safe across the board.13 FDA-approved drugs have a label that 
sets forth the approved uses for that product.14 Pharmaceutical companies may only 
promote FDA-approved, or “on-label,” uses to prescribers and customers.15 A 
pharmaceutical company may not engage in “off-label promotion”—promoting a 
drug for a use that is not on-label.  
A. Off-Label Use and Promotion 
Although pharmaceutical manufacturers may not engage in off-label promotion, 
doctors have the discretion to prescribe drugs for off-label uses. A doctor prescribes 
a drug off-label whenever the prescription varies in any way from the label.16 Thus, 
a doctor may prescribe a drug for a use that is not listed on the label or in a way 
that is not listed on the label, such as varying the dosage. Doctors have the 
discretion to prescribe drugs off-label when their independent medical judgment 
supports the prescription.17 The FDA does not prohibit off-label prescriptions 
because they do not want to deny patients medication that may be effective for the 
treatment of their medical problems.18 Nor does the FDA want to interfere with 
medical innovation or judgment.19 The FDA recognizes that “off-label uses or 
treatment regimens may be important and may even constitute a medically 
recognized standard of care.”20 Although there are risks to using drugs in ways that 
have not been fully vetted by the FDA, there are also many benefits to doing so. 
FDA evaluation of NDAs is often a slow process and may not be able to keep pace 
with cutting edge medical advances that use FDA-approved drugs for off-label 
                                                                                                                 
 
 13. CECCOLI, supra note 8, at 165–68.  
 14. Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational Activities, 62 Fed. 
Reg. 64074, 64075 (Dep’t Health & Human Servs. Dec. 3, 1977) (notice). 
 15. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.100(d) (2006) (describing labeling requirements of new drugs). 
 16. Id. (explaining that off-label prescriptions include prescribing a drug for a purpose 
not designated on the labeling, prescribing to a person in a group other than those for which 
the FDA approved the drug, that is prescribing a drug to a child that was approved for an 
adult or prescribing for an interval of time that surpasses the time indicated on the label).  
 17. 21 U.S.C. § 396 (2006) (explaining that the FDCA does not “limit or interfere with 
the authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe or administer any legally marketed 
device to a patient for any condition or disease within a legitimate health care practitioner-
patient relationship”). Although the government does not place limitations on physicians 
prescribing drugs for off-label uses, the government has placed limits on Medicare 
reimbursement for drugs that have been prescribed for off-label uses. To be reimbursed for 
an off-label use, the off-label use of the drug must be recognized in one or more of several 
named compendia. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395x(t)(2), 1395w-102(e)(1), 1396r-8(k)(6).  
 18. Sandra H. Johnson, Polluting Medical Judgment? False Assumptions in the Pursuit 
of False Claims Regarding Off-Label Prescribing, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 61 (2008). 
 19. Id. 
 20. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., GOOD 
REPRINT PRACTICES FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICAL JOURNAL ARTICLES AND MEDICAL OR 
SCIENTIFIC REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS ON UNAPPROVED NEW USES OF APPROVED DRUGS AND 
APPROVED OR CLEARED MEDICAL DEVICES 3 (2009) [hereinafter FDA, GOOD REPRINT 
PRACTICES], available at www.fda.gov/OHRMS/DOCKETS/98fr/FDA-2008-D-0053-
gdl.pdf. 
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uses. In addition, some rare medical conditions have no on-label treatments because 
the pharmaceutical companies cannot justify the expense of clinical trials for such a 
small patient population.21 In particular, oncology and pediatric patients are often 
recipients of off-label therapies.22 Further, there is little financial incentive to incur 
the cost of a supplemental drug approval process if the drug will soon lose its 
patent protection because generic drug manufacturers will enter the market and 
compete with the patented drug.  
1. The Government’s Interest in Off-Label Promotion 
While there are undoubtedly benefits to prescribing drugs for off-label uses, the 
FDA does not look favorably upon pharmaceutical manufacturers that promote 
their drugs for off-label uses. The Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) 
and the FDA’s implementing regulations generally prohibit manufacturers of new 
drugs from distributing products in interstate commerce for any “intended use” that 
the FDA has not approved as safe and effective or, in the case of generic drugs, 
cleared through a substantial equivalence determination.23 Drug manufacturers 
engage in off-label promotion whenever they “promote or advertise their products 
for purposes, to users, in dosages, or in combinations other than the FDA-approved 
ones.”24 “Promotion” means all proactive activities (written, oral, or otherwise) that 
directly or indirectly market, sell, or support product sales and use, or that 
contribute to the sales growth of a company’s products.25 For example, the FDA 
views promotion as including written labeling and advertising materials, 
interactions with sales representatives, company websites, dissemination of journal 
articles, and, in some cases, trade show presentations, physician training, and 
reimbursement advice.26 Certain Continuing Medical Education (CME) activities 
also can stray into promotional conduct if undertaken for the purpose of inducing 
commercial sales. While it is true that many medications have been used off-
label successfully, the FDA rules prohibiting off-label promotion are meant to 
serve as an incentive for pharmaceutical manufacturers to conduct the clinical 
studies necessary to demonstrate safety and efficacy and ultimately gain FDA 
approval.27  
In the government’s view, off-label marketing presents a danger to patients’ 
health because the drugs have not been proven safe for their marketed uses.28 The 
drugs have either not been through clinical testing for the unapproved use, or 
                                                                                                                 
 
 21. Kesselheim, supra note 7, at 237. 
 22. See id. at 226–38; Steven R. Salbu, Off-Label Use, Prescription, and Marketing of 
FDA-Approved Drugs: An Assessment of Legislative and Regulatory Policy, 51 FLA. L. REV. 
181, 193 (1999) (“Pediatric prescriptions are especially likely to be off-label because many 
drugs are not tested for use by children.”). 
 23. See, e.g., Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act §§ 505(a), 502(o), 501(f)(1)(B), 
301(a), 301(d), 21 U.S.C. §§ 355, 352(o), 351(f)(1)(B), 331(a), 331(d) (2006).  
 24. Salbu, supra note 22, at 191.  
 25. See id.  
 26. See FDA, GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES, supra note 20.  
 27. See Salbu, supra note 22, at 187. 
 28. Kesselheim, supra note 7, at 239. 
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worse, the FDA explicitly rejected the drug as unsafe for the unapproved use based 
on clinical testing. Thus, when doctors prescribe drugs to patients for off-label uses, 
the patients can potentially suffer severe health problems or even death. Further, if 
a drug manufacturer were able to freely engage in off-label marketing, it would 
have little to no incentive to study a drug’s uses and obtain definitive data on safety 
and efficacy. Instead, the manufacturer would simply find the use for which testing 
could be done most cheaply and FDA approval obtained most quickly. The 
manufacturer would then go on to market the drug for other applications that have 
not been proven safe. This would be an end-run around the FDA’s efficacy 
standard.29 More importantly, the public would be denied necessary safety and 
efficacy information regarding the drug.  
2. Pharmaceutical Companies’ Interest in Off-Label Promotion 
Pharmaceutical manufacturers want the largest market possible for their 
products because a larger market means more profit. Thus, when developing drugs, 
manufacturers focus on finding the next “blockbuster” drug30 that will guarantee 
the company at least $1 billion in profits per year.31 In turn, drugs that will not 
likely reach blockbuster status are often not developed.32 As a result, the 
pharmaceutical companies rely upon a small number of blockbuster drugs to carry 
the company.33 Initially, however, the market for the product is largely dependent 
on the outcome of clinical research.34 If the clinical research does not support 
multiple indications for the drug, the FDA may only approve it for limited uses, 
which is a major obstacle to substantial profits.35  
The other important variable for a blockbuster drug is price. Pharmaceutical 
manufacturers in the United States are not subject to price controls.36 Thus, they are 
                                                                                                                 
 
 29. John N. Joseph, David Deaton, Houman Ehsan & Mark A. Bonanno, Enforcement 
Related to Off-Label Marketing and Use of Drugs and Devices: Where Have We Been and 
Where Are We Going?, 2 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 73, 78 (2009). 
 30. CECCOLI, supra note 8, at 2 (“Blockbuster drugs are superior selling drugs whose 
revenues ensure a continual stream of company profits.”). 
 31. Paula Tironi, Pharmaceutical Pricing: A Review of Proposals to Improve Access 
and Affordability of Prescription Drugs, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 311, 324 (2010). 
 32. Lexchin, supra note 12, at 12. 
 33. See, e.g., Gregory J. Glover, Statement on Behalf of Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America Before the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of 
Justice-Antitrust Division: Competition in the Pharmaceutical Marketplace 6 (Mar. 19, 2002) 
[hereinafter Glover Statement], available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020319 
gregoryjglover.pdf (“[Manufacturers] must rely upon a handful of flagship products for the 
majority of their sales, and the commercial life of a drug – from market launch to patent 
expiration – is generally less than seven years. Consequently, even major companies must 
develop a block-buster every two to three years, or face massive financial contraction.”). 
 34. Lexchin, supra note 12, at 13. 
 35. Id. at 13–14 (explaining that drugs that are not found to be as safe or effective as 
other drugs used to treat the same or similar condition would pose a significant financial risk 
to the pharmaceutical company and can sometimes lead to biases in the outcome of clinical 
trials or failure to publish unfavorable results).  
 36. Lexchin, supra note 12, at 15 (explaining that the United States is one of the only 
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able to set prices for blockbuster drugs higher than they would be in Canada or 
Europe.37 When setting the price of drugs, drug manufacturers are concerned with 
recouping the cost of research and development as well as generating enough profit 
to begin research and development of the next generation of drugs.38 In 2001, drug 
manufacturers claimed that the average research and development costs for each 
new drug brought to market were $802 million.39 That figure has been widely 
disputed, but industry outsiders do not have access to pharmaceutical companies’ 
records to assess the accuracy of that estimate. 
The level of competition in the marketplace also influences the price 
considerations. Even if the drug does not have any direct competition at the time 
that the manufacturer introduces it, competition is heavily influenced by patent 
protection for blockbuster drugs. In most cases, pharmaceutical manufacturers do 
not have the entire twenty-year patent life to recoup their research and development 
costs before generic competitors enter the market.40 Because manufacturers must 
                                                                                                                 
developed countries without price controls and that the pharmaceutical lobby ensured that 
the government would not be capable of negotiating price discounts for the new Medicare 
drug benefits in 2006).  
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Cost to Bring New Drug to Market: $802m, HEALTHCARE ECONOMIST (April 29, 
2006), http://healthcare-economist.com/2006/04/29/802m/ (citing Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald 
W. Hansen & Henry G. Grabowski, The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug 
Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151 (2003)). 
 40. A pharmaceutical patent lasts for twenty years. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006). The 
patent holder, however, does not have the full twenty years to enjoy patent protection and 
prevent generic manufacturers from entering the market. The patent holder loses a portion of 
the patent life while seeking the FDA’s approval of the patented drug. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, 
OVERDOSE: HOW EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT REGULATION STIFLES PHARMACEUTICAL 
INNOVATION 59 (2006). Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, some of the time spent on FDA 
approval is reinstated. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355; 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271). One 
day of patent life is restored for every two days spent on the clinical study process and for 
each day the FDA spent reviewing the NDA. EPSTEIN, supra, at 59–60. The maximum 
amount of patent time that may be reinstated is five years. Despite the returned patent period 
of up to five years, pharmaceutical patents have useful lives of nine to thirteen years while 
other industries enjoy useful patent lives of more than eighteen years. Id. at 60. The Hatch-
Waxman Act also limits the ability of patent holders to prevent generic copies of their drugs 
from entering the market. Under the Act, generic manufacturers are permitted to both test 
and manufacture their drug during the patent holder’s patent period, which puts the generic 
manufacturer in a position to sell the generic equivalent immediately upon patent expiration. 
Id. at 60; 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). The Hatch-Waxman Act also simplifies the drug approval 
process for generic manufacturers. Generic manufacturers simply have to demonstrate 
bioequivalence to gain approval of the generic drug rather than safety and efficacy through 
clinical trials. EPSTEIN, supra, at 62. Bioequivalence means that the generic drug “act[s] in 
the body in the same way as the original innovator drug.” NIHCM FOUNDATION, A PRIMER: 
GENERIC DRUGS, PATENTS, AND THE PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETPLACE 4 (2002). To gain 
FDA approval, generic manufacturers must prove that the generic has the same active 
ingredient, strength, dosage form, and route of administration as the branded drug. 
Bioequivalence, GENERIC PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIATION, http://www.gphaonline.org/ 
issues/bioequivalence.  
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apply for a patent during the clinical testing stage, there may only be ten years to 
recoup their investment rather than twenty years.41 Once a patent expires, the 
manufacturer has little incentive to aggressively market the drug, because after 
generic manufacturers enter the market, the price of the blockbuster drug will fall 
substantially. In addition to competition from generic manufacturers at the end of 
the patent life of the blockbuster drug, pharmaceutical manufacturers may also face 
competition from other drug makers that introduce drugs to treat the same 
disease.42  
To maximize profit potential, drug manufacturers must price blockbuster drugs 
high and market them aggressively during the patent period. Drug manufacturers 
are banned from promoting drugs for off-label uses, but prescribers are not 
prohibited from prescribing drugs for off-label uses if, based on their medical 
judgment, they believe the drug will be beneficial for the patient. Thus, from a 
pharmaceutical company’s perspective, there is a huge market that can be tapped 
by convincing prescribers that their drug is beneficial for off-label uses. If a drug 
manufacturer wants to exploit the untapped market for a drug, it has two choices. 
The drug manufacturer can either apply to the FDA to have an off-label use added 
to a drug’s labeling (another costly approval process) or it can circumvent the FDA 
and promote the drug to prescribers for off-label uses. Because the pharmaceutical 
industry is largely motivated by profit, manufacturers often choose the latter path.  
B. Regulatory Environment 
When aggressive marketing crosses the line into off-label promotion, there are 
numerous federal and state agencies involved in enforcement. Because Corporate 
Integrity Agreements (CIAs) are entered into with the federal government, this 
Article focuses on the federal agencies charged with regulating the promotional 
activities of pharmaceutical companies.  
The FDA is responsible for the approval of new drugs and for monitoring the 
promotional activities of pharmaceutical manufacturers, but the FDA plays a 
relatively small role in enforcement because of the relationship to Medicare and 
Medicaid. Medicare is a federally funded insurance program for individuals who 
are age sixty-five or older.43 Medicaid is a joint federal‐state program that supports 
states’ coverage of medical care and other support services for certain categories of 
low‐income individuals.44 The federal government pays a share, known as the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 41. EPSTEIN, supra note 40, at 59.  
 42. See, e.g., Glover Statement, supra note 33, at 8 (“[B]reakthrough drugs generally 
face competition within their initial patent life from other branded drugs of the same 
therapeutic class. This sets up a competitive environment in which branded rivals rely 
heavily on product differentiation to achieve competitive advantage over other branded 
rivals.”). 
 43. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395−1395h; Medicare Program–General Information: Overview, 
CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, http://www.cms.gov/ MedicareGenInfo/ 
(noting that Medicare provides coverage to those aged sixty-five and older, individuals with 
certain disabilities, and individuals with end-stage renal disease). 
 44. Id.  
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Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP), of each state’s Medicaid costs.45 
Once the FDA has approved a drug, Medicare and Medicaid provide 
reimbursements for prescription drug costs. On the federal level, both programs are 
run by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). Because the 
promotion of drugs for off-label uses can lead to off-label prescriptions that are 
reimbursed by CMS, the FDA is not the only government agency concerned with 
the promotional activities of pharmaceutical manufacturers.  
CMS does not cover prescription drug costs for Medicare and Medicaid patients 
without regard to whether the FDA has approved the drug, but FDA approval is not 
the sole consideration in reimbursement decisions. CMS will pay prescription drug 
claims for any on-label use for prescription drugs that have been approved under 
the FDCA.46 For off-label prescriptions, however, the reimbursement is contingent 
on whether there is a “medically accepted indication” for the drug.47 To constitute a 
“medically accepted indication” for the drug, the use of the drug in an off-label 
manner must be “included or approved for inclusion” in one of the three endorsed 
drug compendia.48 A drug compendium is a complete listing of FDA-approved 
drugs and biologics that includes an explanation of how each drug works, proper 
dosing, and whether the drug is recommended for treatment for specific diseases.49 
Because scientific information may support the use of particular drugs for 
indications not approved by the FDA, the compendium may recommend uses that 
are not a part of the FDA-approved label for the drug. Thus, if an off-label use is 
endorsed in one of the three approved drug compendia, CMS will likely reimburse 
for the off-label prescription. CMS also determines the rate of reimbursement for a 
particular drug.50 Unlike the FDA’s decision making, which is one of “benefit 
versus risk,” CMS’s coverage-for-reimbursement decision “is first one of benefit 
per se, and then one of benefit versus cost.”51 If a state makes an improper 
Medicaid payment to a health care provider for an off-label use that is not listed in 
one of the drug compendia, there will be a corresponding improper federal payment 
by CMS because Medicaid is a matching program.52  
                                                                                                                 
 
 45. See THE KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, THE MEDICAID 
PROGRAM AT A GLANCE 2 (2010), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/7235.cfm. 
 46. Social Security Act § 1927(k)(2)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 1396r–8(k)(2)(A)(i). 
 47. Social Security Act § 1927(d)(1)(B)(i), (k)(3), (k)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 1396r–
8(d)(1)(B)(i), 8(k)(3), 8(k)(6). 
 48. Id. § 1927(g)(1)(B)(i), (k)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 1396r–8(g)(1)(B)(i), (k)(6). The three 
approved drug compendia include: (1) the American Hospital Formulary Service Drug 
Information; (2) the United States Pharmacopeia-Drug Information; and (3) the DRUGDEX 
Information System. Id. § 1927(g)(1)(B)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 1396r–8 (g)(1)(B)(i). CMS uses 
different compendia to determine a “medically accepted indication” for anti-cancer drugs. 
See id. § 1861(t)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(t)(2)(A).  
 49. Joshua Cohen, Andrew Wilson & Laura Faden, Off-Label Use Reimbursement, 64 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 391, 396 (2009). 
 50. Patsner, supra note 10, at 55. 
 51. Id. (“The CMS standard clearly encompasses financial security so that money is not 
wasted on expensive medical products with little or no advantage for its beneficiaries over 
existing, less expensive ones.”). 
 52. Bolstering the Safety Net: Eliminating Medicaid Fraud: Hearing Before the Federal 
Financial Management, Government Information, and International Security Subcommittee 
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Due to the reimbursement issues involving CMS, the Health and Human 
Services Office of Inspector General (OIG) is necessarily involved in enforcement. 
OIG is responsible for eliminating “waste, abuse, and fraud” in Health and Human 
Services (HHS) programs and operations.53 One of OIG’s chief responsibilities is 
protecting the integrity of programs such as Medicare and Medicaid. Within OIG, 
the Office of Investigations is responsible for performing investigative activities 
related to allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement in HHS programs 
by applicants, grantees, contractors, or by HHS employees in the performance of 
their official duties.54 In addition, the Office of Investigations serves as the liaison 
to the Department of Justice (DOJ) on all matters relating to investigations of HHS 
programs when OIG has reasonable grounds to believe federal criminal law has 
been violated.55 OIG also serves as the liaison with CMS and investigates Medicare 
and Medicaid fraud by pharmaceutical companies.56 Further, OIG serves as the 
liaison with state licensing boards with regard to exclusion, compliance, and 
enforcement activities.57 OIG also administers CIAs and enforces permissive and 
mandatory exclusions imposed through liaison with CMS, the DOJ, and other 
governmental and private sector entities.58 Finally, OIG provides industry guidance 
on compliance with the federal health care laws.59 
The DOJ is also heavily involved in health care fraud and abuse cases because it 
has joint responsibility with OIG for pharmaceutical promotional fraud and abuse 
under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).60 
There are several ways that the DOJ can become involved in a pharmaceutical 
marketing fraud case. First, the FDA may refer a case that involves the FDCA to 
the Consumer Protection Branch of the Civil Division.61 The FDCA prohibits the 
                                                                                                                 
of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. 10 (2006) 
(testimony of Daniel R. Levinson, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services). It should be noted that detection of off-label uses has been a problem because 
prior authorization is not needed before most pharmaceuticals are dispensed. In those 
situations, it is difficult to ascertain whether the drugs are being prescribed for off-label uses. 
Audits are often utilized to determine off-label use. See Cohen et al., supra note 49, at 395. 
 53. Organizational Structure, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., https://oig.hhsc.state.tx.us/ 
AboutOIG/OrgStructure.aspx. 
 54. Office of Inspector General, Statement of Organization, Functions and Delegations 
of Authority, 69 Fed. Reg. 40,390 (Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. July 2, 2004) (notice).  
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 40,391. 
 59. Christopher D. Zalesky, Pharmaceutical Marketing Practices: Balancing Public 
Health and Law Enforcement Interests; Moving Beyond Regulation-Through-Litigation, 39 
J. HEALTH L. 235, 247 (2006). 
 60. P.L. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 201 (2006)). HIPAA created 
the Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Program, an expansive program to address fraud 
and abuse in health care, including both public and private health plans. This program is 
under the joint direction of the Secretary of HHS and the attorney general. It is designed to 
coordinate federal, state, and local law enforcement activities with respect to health care 
fraud and abuse. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7c(a)(1).  
 61. See U.S. ATTORNEYS MANUAL 4-8.205 (2011). The DOJ’s Consumer Protection 
Division of the Civil Branch was formerly known as the Office of Consumer Litigation. Id. 
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introduction of any misbranded drug into interstate commerce.62 A drug is 
misbranded when its label is false or misleading or when it has inadequate 
directions for use.63 All intended uses must have adequate directions for their use, 
but the drug label may only contain information on approved uses. Therefore, the 
government’s theory under the FDCA when pursuing off-label promotion is that 
the manufacturer has provided inadequate directions for the intended off-label use 
of the drug. Because the drug has not been shown to be safe and effective for the 
off-label use, a drug promoted for uses that are not listed on the label, by definition, 
must be misbranded because there are no directions for the use.64 Alternatively, the 
government may pursue a pharmaceutical manufacturer for a misbranding violation 
under the theory that by promoting the drug for off-label uses, the pharmaceutical 
manufacturer has introduced an unapproved new drug into the market. An FDA-
approved drug can be considered a new drug if it is promoted for unapproved 
uses.65 Therefore, promoting an existing drug for a new use is tantamount to 
introducing an unapproved new drug into interstate commerce. 
Second, the DOJ may get involved due to a civil False Claims Act (FCA) case 
brought by a whistleblower. The FCA makes it unlawful to knowingly present, or 
cause to be presented, false or fraudulent claims paid by the government.66 The 
FCA allows private citizens, known as “relators,” to bring qui tam suits in the name 
of the government, based on the individual’s knowledge of fraud against the 
government.67 Whistleblowers are incentivized to bring suits because they are 
                                                                                                                 
at 4-8.010. 
 62. 21 U.S.C. § 331(a). 
 63. Id. § 352(a), (f). “Adequate directions for use” means that the directions are 
sufficiently clear that a layperson could use a drug safely and effectively for the intended 
use. 21 C.F.R § 201.5 (2010). 
 64. 21 C.F.R. § 201.100. 
 65. Id. § 310.3(h)(4)–(5). The newness of a drug may arise due to its use in treating a 
condition “even though such drug is not a new drug when used in another disease . . . .” Id. § 
310.3(h)(4). Further, the newness of a drug may be shown by using an approved drug in a 
dosage that differs from the label “even though such drug when used in other dosage . . . is 
not a new drug.” Id.§ 310.3(h)(5).  
 66. 18 U.S.C. § 287. 
 67. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1). To discourage opportunistic relators, the FCA prevents 
relators from bringing a claim based on publicly disclosed information. JENNIFER STAMAN, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22743, HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE LAWS AFFECTING 
MEDICARE AND MEDICAID: AN OVERVIEW 10–12 (2010), http://aging.senate.gov/ 
crs/medicaid20.pdf. Thus, if there was a public disclosure of information in: 
(1) a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, (2) in a congressional, 
administrative, or Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, hearing, 
audit, or investigation, or (3) from the news media, unless the action is brought 
by the Attorney General or the relator bringing the action is an “original 
source” of the information. A relator was defined as an original source if the 
relator had direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the 
allegations of the FCA claim are based and had voluntarily provided the 
information to the government before filing an action.  
Id. at 9 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)–(B)). The Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (PPACA) loosens some of these requirements. Under the PPACA, the government is 
given discretion to determine whether to allow a qui tam suit to go forward despite the fact 
that the information was publicly disclosed. Id. Further, PPACA makes the public disclosure 
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entitled to a portion of the recovery if the suit is successful. Relators file suit under 
the FCA for fraud resulting from off-label promotion due to the negative effects it 
has on state and federally funded programs such as Medicaid, which may prohibit 
reimbursement for off-label prescriptions. The suit is filed under seal and the 
government has sixty days to determine whether to take over the case as its own or 
to leave the case to the relator to litigate.68 If the DOJ decides to take over the qui 
tam case, it may serve a civil investigative demand (CID) to obtain documentary 
evidence “for the purpose of ascertaining whether any person is or has been 
engaged in” a violation of the FCA.69  
The theory of liability under the FCA is that a manufacturer is liable if it 
knowingly engages in a promotional program that induces third parties to file 
Medicare or Medicaid reimbursement claims for off-label uses that were not 
eligible for reimbursement.70 The difficulty is that even though the federal 
government pays for drugs provided to Medicare or Medicaid beneficiaries, the 
pharmaceutical manufacturers do not bill the federal government directly for their 
drugs. Thus, the government could not use the normal theory of liability under the 
FCA—that the pharmaceutical manufacturer submitted a claim to the government 
for payment of prescriptions that are not reimbursable under Medicare and 
Medicaid. Because submitting a claim to the government is the touchstone theory 
of liability under the FCA, the government needed to create the innovative theory 
concerning inducement to file a claim. This theory has not been tested in court. 
Indeed, it would be difficult to prove that a particular reimbursement claim is due 
to off-label promotion as opposed to the doctor’s professional judgment. The 
government has used the theory to leverage huge settlements with pharmaceutical 
manufacturers, however, because the manufacturers could not risk testing the 
government’s theory in court.  
In May 2009, Congress simplified the theory of recovery under the FCA when it 
enacted the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA).71 Under FERA, 
it is no longer a requirement that a false claim be submitted to the government. 
Instead, if the false claim is paid out of government funds or with funds that are 
“spent or used on the Government’s behalf or to advance a Government program or 
interest,” liability will attach.72 Thus, the theory of liability under the FCA is much 
more straightforward after FERA. If Medicare and Medicaid reimburse a 
                                                                                                                 
bar applicable only if the information was obtained from federal government or media 
sources. It does not apply if the information was learned from a state source. Id. at 10. 
Finally, the PPACA alters the definition of original source.  
Under PPACA, an original source is one who (1) has voluntarily disclosed to 
the government the information on which allegations or transactions in a claim 
are based, or (2) has knowledge that is independent of and materially adds to 
the publicly disclosed allegations or transactions, and who has voluntarily 
provided the information to the government before filing an action. 
Id. (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B)). 
 68. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2). 
 69. Id. §§ 3733(a)(I), 3733(l)(2). The CID may include document requests, written 
interrogatories, and depositions. Id. 
 70. Osborn, supra note 7, at 329. 
 71. S. 386, 111th Cong. (2009) (enacted).  
 72. Id. 
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pharmaceutical manufacturer’s products, any violation of the FDCA, such as off-
label promotion, is actionable under the FCA.  
Third, OIG may refer a case to the DOJ because they have a reasonable belief 
that federal criminal law, such as the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS), has been 
violated. The AKS makes it unlawful to: (1) knowingly and willfully; (2) offer or 
pay, solicit or receive; (3) any remuneration;73 (4) to induce the referral of an 
individual to another person or entity for the “furnishing of any item or service”; or 
to induce the purchasing or ordering of such item or service; (5) payable “in whole 
or in part” by a federal health care program.74 Prior to the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (PPACA),75 there was a circuit split on whether the mens rea 
requirement of “knowingly and willfully” required a specific intent to violate the 
AKS.76 The specific intent requirement that some courts imposed made it more 
difficult to obtain a conviction because defendants could assert that they did not 
know that their conduct violated the AKS. The PPACA resolved the circuit split, 
stating: “a defendant does not have to have actual knowledge of, or specific intent 
to commit a violation of, the anti-kickback statute.”77 Criminal conviction under the 
AKS leads to a fine of up to $25,000, up to five years imprisonment, and 
mandatory exclusion from participation in Medicare and Medicaid for up to one 
year.78  
In addition to being a source for criminal charges, violations of the AKS are 
often used as the basis for civil actions against pharmaceutical companies under the 
FCA.79 If a person or entity is involved in a kickback scheme involving Medicare 
or Medicaid, that person or entity may face civil liability under the FCA if the 
person knowingly submits, or causes a third party to submit, false or fraudulent 
claims for goods or services tainted by kickbacks.80 Prior to the enactment of the 
PPACA, relators attempting to hold pharmaceutical manufacturers liable under the 
FCA for violations of the AKS had to prove that the claims submitted were false.81 
It was difficult for relators to prove falsity because even though the AKS may have 
been violated, the prices for the drugs that were submitted for reimbursement were 
correct.82 Thus, relators alleged that the claim was legally false because the entity 
or person submitting the claim falsely certified compliance with the AKS.83 An 
                                                                                                                 
 
 73. “Remuneration” does not include a discount or other reduction in price obtained by 
a provider of services or other entity if the reduction in price is properly disclosed and 
reflected in the costs claimed or charges made by the provider or entity under a federal 
health care program. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7b(b)(3).  
 74. Id. § 1320a–7b(b)(2). 
 75. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 121 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of 21, 
25, 26, 29 & 42 U.S.C.). 
 76. STAMAN, supra note 67, at 4 (citing Hanlester Network v. Shalala 51 F.3d 1390, 
1399–1400 (9th Cir. 1995) and United States v. Starks, 157 F.3d 833 (11th Cir. 1998)). 
 77. Id. at 4–5; Pub. L. No. 111-148, §6402(f)(2), 124 Stat. 121, 759 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 1320a–7b(h)). 
 78. STAMAN, supra note 67, at 2. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See id. at 8 n.43. 
 81. Rost v. Pfizer Inc., 736 F. Supp. 2d 367, 375–378 (D. Mass. 2010).  
 82. Id. at 376. 
 83. “False certification can be express, where the claim is accompanied by an explicit 
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example may be helpful here. Assume that a pharmaceutical manufacturer has paid 
doctors to prescribe its drugs in violation of the AKS. The doctor prescribes the 
manufacturer’s drugs to a Medicare or Medicaid patient who then goes to the 
pharmacy to fill the prescription. After filling the prescription, the pharmacy 
submits a claim for reimbursement to Medicare or Medicaid. The claim, the theory 
goes, is tainted by the pharmaceutical manufacturer’s kickback and should be 
considered false. Again, a pharmaceutical manufacturer does not directly submit 
claims to the government for reimbursement. Therefore, this tainted claim theory 
under the AKS ran into the most difficulty when the claims were not submitted by a 
participant in the kickback scheme. In other words, when the claim was submitted 
by innocent third parties, such as pharmacies, that: (1) were unaware of the 
kickbacks, (2) only certified their own compliance with the AKS, or (3) did not 
expressly certify compliance with the AKS,84 the government could not 
demonstrate falsity under the FCA. 
The PPACA does away with the falsity requirement for claims submitted by an 
innocent third party. The amendment to the AKS states that “a claim that includes 
items or services resulting from a violation of this section constitutes a false or 
fraudulent claim for the purposes of [the FCA].”85 It does not matter whether the 
doctor who was part of the kickback scheme submits the tainted claim or an 
innocent third party submits the claim. Thus, relators no longer need to claim that 
the innocent third party expressly or impliedly certified compliance with the AKS 
to prove that there was a false claim under the FCA. Thus, the PPACA removed a 
major hurdle to holding pharmaceutical manufacturers liable under the FCA for 
claims tainted by the AKS.  
In sum, the FDA, OIG, and the DOJ work collectively to enforce the federal 
health care fraud laws against pharmaceutical manufacturers. Most cases will 
involve misbranding violations, kickbacks, or false claims. Pharmaceutical 
manufacturers’ potential liability for illegal marketing practices has increased in the 
last few years through amendments to the FCA by FERA and the PPACA. Further, 
the PPACA makes it easier to bring cases against pharmaceutical manufacturers 
involving kickbacks and false claims.  
C. Exclusion 
The Social Security Act authorizes the Secretary of HHS (and, through a 
delegation of authority, OIG) to exclude individuals and entities that have engaged 
in fraud or abuse from participation in federal health care programs, such as 
Medicare and Medicaid.86 OIG sets its own policies with respect to its exclusion 
authority: “Exclusion means that items and services furnished, ordered or 
prescribed by a specified individual or entity will not be reimbursed under 
                                                                                                                 
statement of compliance, or implied, where the act of submitting the claim implies 
compliance.” Id. at 375. 
 84. See, e.g., id. at 367–78 (finding that these types of claims are not false under the 
FCA). 
 85. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7b(b)(2) (2006). 
 86. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 (2011). The statutory term “participation” refers to individuals 
and entities that have entered into an agreement with the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services to bill and receive program payment for services furnished to beneficiaries. Id. 
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Medicare, Medicaid and all other federal health care programs until the individual 
or entity is reinstated by OIG.”87 Exclusion for a period of five years is mandatory 
following a criminal conviction, and is permissive when a provider engages in less 
serious infractions.88 The effect of exclusion is that no federal health care program 
payment may be made for any items or services either (1) “furnished” by an 
excluded individual or entity or (2) directed or prescribed by an excluded 
physician.89  
In 1992, OIG stated that it would only apply its exclusion authority against 
participating providers who receive payment directly from the program, such as 
physicians and hospitals.90 Thus, OIG did not assert exclusion authority over 
indirect providers, such as pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, because 
they did not receive Medicare and Medicaid payments directly.91 In 1997, however, 
OIG changed course and expanded its exclusion authority to include indirect 
providers such as pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies.92 Under the new 
rule, the effect of exclusion of a pharmaceutical manufacturer is that “no payment 
would be made to any direct provider for items and services manufactured, 
distributed or otherwise provided” by the excluded pharmaceutical manufacturer.93 
OIG must follow a standard procedure to exercise its exclusion authority against 
a pharmaceutical company or any other entity. When OIG wants to exclude an 
entity, it sends a notice of intent to exclude.94 The entity has thirty days to submit a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 87. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.2 (1999) (emphasis omitted). 
 88. STAMAN, supra note 67, at 2–3 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(b)) (“Exclusion is 
mandatory for those convicted of certain offenses, including (1) a criminal offense related to 
the delivery of an item or service under Medicare, Medicaid, or a state health care program; 
(2) a criminal offense relating to neglect or abuse of patients in connection with the delivery 
of a health care item or service; or (3) a felony relating to the unlawful manufacture, 
distribution, prescription, or dispensing of a controlled substance. OIG has ‘permissive’ 
authority to exclude an entity or an individual from a federal health program under numerous 
circumstances, including conviction of certain misdemeanors relating to fraud, theft, 
embezzlement, breach of fiduciary duty or other financial misconduct; a conviction based on 
an interference with or obstruction of an investigation into a criminal offense; and revocation 
or suspension of a health care practitioner’s license for reasons bearing on the individual’s or 
entity’s professional competence, professional performance, or financial integrity.”). 
 89. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.1901. 
 90. Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Amendments to OIG Exclusion and CMP 
Authorities Resulting from Public Law 100-93, 57 Fed. Reg. 3298, 3300 (Jan. 29, 1992) (to 
be codified at 42 C.F.R. §§ 1001–06).  
 91. Id. (explaining that although OIG has the authority to do so, they choose not to 
include entities that furnish items covered by Medicare but that do not receive program 
payments directly due to the difficulty of administering the exclusions). 
 92. 42 C.F.R. §1000.10 (2003) (“Furnished refers to items or services provided or 
supplied, directly or indirectly, by any individual or entity. This includes items and services 
manufactured, distributed or otherwise provided by individuals or entities that do not directly 
submit claims to Medicare, Medicaid or other Federal health care programs, but that supply 
items or services to providers, practitioners or suppliers who submit claims to these 
programs for such items or services.” (emphasis in original)). 
 93. Id. 
 94. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.2001 (2011). 
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written response.95 If OIG reviews the entity’s response and decides to exclude, it 
issues a notice of exclusion to the entity.96 Upon exclusion, the entity has the right 
to an appeal before an administrative law judge (ALJ).97 Following the ALJ’s 
decision, the entity has thirty days to appeal the decision to the Departmental 
Appeals Board.98 The Departmental Appeals Board’s decision is considered final 
and may be appealed in federal court.99  
D. Corporate Integrity Agreements  
Despite the fact that exclusion is available as a remedy, it is hardly, if ever, 
invoked against a pharmaceutical manufacturer. Instead, the government uses the 
threat of exclusion to convince manufacturers to enter into CIAs and enact far-
reaching corporate reforms. CIAs are administrative settlements negotiated with 
OIG that require organizations to undertake compliance and integrity obligations 
for a term of three to five years.100 Organizations enter into CIAs to settle alleged 
violations of federal health care program requirements such as off-label promotion 
of drugs, kickbacks, or overbilling of Medicare and Medicaid for health services.101 
In most situations, the CIA is one part of a global settlement that involves the DOJ, 
the FDA, civil litigants, and the states.102 The organization pays a large fine and, in 
return, OIG agrees not to pursue exclusion of the organization from Medicare and 
Medicaid. OIG has entered into hundreds of CIAs in the past ten years.103 At the 
beginning of most CIAs, there is a statement that the company entering into the 
agreement has a compliance program in place.104 Next, the CIA will address the 
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 96. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 1001.2002, 2003 (explaining the notice requirements). 
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 98. Id. § 1005.21. 
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 102. For example, in 2009 Pfizer entered into a CIA and a settlement agreement with the 
DOJ, the TRICARE Management Activity, and the relators in the civil FCA case. See 
CORPORATE INTEGRITY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AND PFIZER INC. (Aug. 31, 2009) 
[hereinafter CIA PFIZER 2009], available at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/agreements/ 
pfizer_inc_08312009.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (2009), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/ma/Press Office - Press Release Files/Pfizer/Pfizer 
Settlement Agreement.pdf.  
 103. For a complete list of CIAs, see Corporate Integrity Agreement Documents, OFF. 
INSPECTOR GEN. (Nov. 4, 2011), http://www.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/cia_list.asp (listing and 
providing CIAs beginning in 2003). Many of these CIAs involve named individuals, such as 
doctors, or health care providers, such as hospitals, but the focus here is on CIAs involving 
pharmaceutical manufacturers. See also Ralph F. Hall, Corporate Integrity Agreements, in 
PUNISHING CORPORATE CRIME: LEGAL PENALTIES FOR CRIMINAL AND REGULATORY 
VIOLATIONS 97, 99 (James T. O’Reilly et al. eds., 2009). 
 104. See Hall, supra note 103, at 100. 
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scope of the agreement which ordinarily involves: (1) whether the whole company 
has obligations under the agreement or only certain subsidiaries or divisions; (2) 
the responsibilities of the individuals within the company; and (3) the kind of 
business endeavors that are covered.105 With each of these, the government wants 
the scope to be as broad as possible, and the company wants it to be narrow to save 
the expense of compliance and the risk of future violations.106  
Once the term and scope of the agreement have been set forth, the CIA will 
address the “Corporate Integrity Obligations” that the organization must meet. It is 
standard for the CIA to require the creation of a compliance committee and the 
selection of a compliance officer who is a part of senior management and has 
immediate contact with the board of directors.107 The organization is required to 
inform OIG if it changes the compliance officer.108 In some cases, OIG may dictate 
to whom the compliance officer should or should not report within the 
organization.109 OIG may also specify the members of the compliance committee 
and the information flow between the compliance committee and other business 
units within the organization.110 In recent years, OIG has also required the board of 
directors to take an active role in supervising the compliance program and make 
certifications regarding its effectiveness.111  
As the use of CIAs has increased, so too has OIG’s level of sophistication in 
crafting the Corporate Integrity Obligations. Before 2008, most CIAs required 
corporate compliance officers to make certifications regarding the effectiveness of 
the company’s compliance program.112 Beginning with Cephalon, Inc.’s September 
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summarizing its review and oversight of [the company’s] compliance with federal health 
care program requirements, FDA requirements, and the obligations of this CIA. Each 
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with the resolution.” Id. (quoting CORPORATE INTEGRITY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE OFFICE 
OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AND 
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 112. See Memmott & McCubrey, supra note 100, at 53 (explaining that compliance 
officers had to certify, inter alia, that training had been completed, that policies had been 
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2008 CIA, however, OIG began requiring certifications from executives and upper 
management.113 The new requirements, entitled “Management Accountability and 
Certifications,” generally require the “certifying employee” to sign a certification 
stating that: (1) the individual has received training and comprehends the 
compliance requirements and responsibilities for the individual’s department; (2) 
the individual’s job responsibilities include ensuring compliance for the 
individual’s department; and (3) the department is “in compliance with all 
applicable federal health care program requirements, FDA requirements and the 
obligations of the CIA.”114 These new certification requirements raise the stakes for 
management in the event of noncompliance because the certifying individuals may 
be subject to personal liability.115 
In addition to certification requirements, the CIAs require the organization to 
implement codes of conduct that set forth the compliance rules and obligations, 
anonymous reporting systems, and a nonretaliation policy.116 Further, CIAs 
typically require training on the obligations within the CIAs and the company’s 
compliance program.117 Another common provision of CIAs is the company’s 
obligation to hire an Independent Review Organization (IRO) to audit systems and 
transactions within the organization.118 The IRO typically has a limited focus on 
particular compliance obligations.119 CIAs also mandate a toll-free hotline system 
that allows individuals to anonymously disclose noncompliance directly to the 
compliance office.120 The organizations must follow up and investigate all reports 
of noncompliance.121 There are also substantial reporting requirements for 
allegations of misconduct.122 Further, CIAs require periodic or annual reports to 
OIG, and OIG retains the right to review the organization’s documents to ensure 
                                                                                                                 
reviewed and updated, and that the company is in compliance with all federal health care 
program requirements). 
 113. Id. Specifically, CIAs may now require certifications from the chairman, president, 
chief executive officer, executive vice presidents, senior vice presidents, executive directors, 
business unit sales and marketing vice presidents, chief marketing and operations officer, 
chief medical officers, business unit sales directors, medical directors of communications 
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Id. 
 114. See Hall, supra note 103, at 104 (quoting CIA ELI LILLY, supra note 111); see also 
Memmott & McCubrey, supra note 100, at 53.  
 115. Hall, supra note 103, at 104.  
 116. Id. at 105; see also CORPORATE INTEGRITY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE OFFICE OF 
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AND PFIZER INC. 
(May 11, 2004) [hereinafter CIA PFIZER 2004] (on file with author).  
 117. Hall, supra note 103, at 105–06.  
 118. Id. at 106–07; see CIA PFIZER 2009, supra note 102, at app. B at 1 (“Pfizer shall 
retain an Independent Review Organization (IRO) to perform reviews to assist Pfizer in 
assessing and evaluating its systems, processes, policies, procedures, and practices related to 
Pfizer’s Promotional and Product Related Functions.”). 
 119. Hall, supra note 103, at 107. 
 120. Id. at 107. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 108. 
2012] ENFORCING INTEGRITY 1053 
 
compliance with the CIA.123 Finally, CIAs specify the terms under which a breach 
of the agreement will be found and the consequences for that breach. A breach of 
the CIA can lead to substantial penalties, or, if there is a “material breach,” OIG 
can pursue exclusion of the company from Medicare and Medicaid.124 
II. CIAS AND DETERRENCE  
OIG has entered into CIAs in lieu of pursuing drug manufacturers civilly or 
criminally for health care fraud, which would lead to either permissive or 
mandatory exclusion from Medicare and Medicaid. The main goals of the CIA 
appear to be reform and rehabilitation. This Part will examine the costs and benefits 
of CIAs and whether CIAs are an effective deterrent for off-label promotional 
activities. This Part concludes that CIAs are ineffective deterrents for repeat 
offenders of the promotional laws.  
A. The Use of CIAs Instead of Exclusion Authority 
1. The Cost-Benefit Analysis of CIAs 
CIAs are beneficial to the manufacturer, the government, and the public at large. 
Because of the CIA, the pharmaceutical manufacturer is able to avoid being 
excluded from federal health care programs such as Medicare and Medicaid. 
Medicare and Medicaid revenue brings in millions, or in some cases, billions, of 
dollars of revenue for pharmaceutical manufacturers every year.125 If all of the 
drugs from a particular manufacturer were excluded from Medicare and Medicaid 
reimbursement, the manufacturer would be in danger of collapse, which would lead 
to negative externalities for the employees and patients. The company would lose 
revenue, and employees would lose their jobs. In addition, the patients would be 
greatly harmed. Elderly and poor patients would no longer be able to obtain their 
prescriptions through Medicare and Medicaid. They would have to either pay for 
the medications themselves or switch to medications produced by a non-excluded 
pharmaceutical manufacturer. But it is not always the case that there would be a 
substitutable drug available from another manufacturer. Thus, pharmaceutical 
companies benefit from the CIA because they are able to avoid these negative 
consequences. In turn, patients benefit from CIAs because they do not incur the 
negative externalities that would result from exclusion. Patients are able to continue 
their treatment without any interruption in benefits because the manufacturer 
entered into a CIA.  
Finally, the government benefits from entering into a CIA because CIAs allow 
the government to save the expense of trial, collect a large settlement, gain 
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sweeping reforms, and appear to be tough on health care fraud.126 Health care fraud 
cases, particularly those based on off-label marketing, take years to investigate. In 
addition, the cases are challenging, multifaceted, and expensive to prosecute.127 
Pharmaceutical companies have a wealth of resources and will mount a vigorous 
defense to any charges of wrongdoing.128 By settling, the government saves 
substantial resources that would otherwise be expended to take the case to trial and 
also avoids the risk that some of their fraud theories may not stand up in court. The 
government also benefits from settlement because the threat of exclusion assists the 
government in obtaining huge settlements from drug manufacturers. Further, the 
money that the government obtains goes straight into the federal treasury, which 
benefits the public. Inevitably, the settlement includes reforms agreed to by the 
manufacturer that greatly benefit the public. The government sends out press 
releases touting the huge settlements and reform concessions that they obtained 
from pharmaceutical manufacturers, which makes them appear tough on health care 
fraud. The government appears even tougher when they are able to assert that as 
part of the settlement, a subsidiary of the drug manufacturer pled guilty to a felony 
in federal court or the manufacturer itself pled guilty to a misdemeanor in federal 
court. A guilty plea by a subsidiary, however, is often a sham because the 
manufacturer is able to transfer assets and operations from the subsidiary to the 
parent company prior to the exclusion. As a result, the exclusion of the subsidiary 
does not impact the parent company. Similarly, a plea of guilty to misdemeanor 
charges does not lead to exclusion of the manufacturer.  
Despite the benefits of the CIA, the costs are substantial. The government bears 
very little of the cost, because the majority of the costs of compliance are paid by 
the drug manufacturer.129 The drug manufacturer must pay the fine, which may 
range from hundreds of millions of dollars to several billion dollars plus additional 
costs that spring from the implementation of the CIA.130 The costs associated with 
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the CIA may include: hiring an independent review organization (IRO); changes to 
the corporate compliance program; changes to the corporate structure in the area of 
corporate compliance and legal counsel; and training programs.131 Nevertheless, it 
is in the best interests of the manufacturer to enter into a CIA no matter how 
onerous the terms because the company must consider the potential loss of revenue 
from Medicare and Medicaid. The manufacturer simply cannot risk the loss of 
revenue and damage to the company that would result from exclusion from 
Medicare and Medicaid. Thus, for the manufacturer, the government, and the 
public, the benefits of CIAs far outweigh the costs. 
2. The Repeated Use of CIAs: The Case of Pfizer 
Although government investigations into health care fraud pose substantial risks 
for pharmaceutical manufacturers, manufacturers realize that the government is not 
going to pursue them in court and seek exclusion because of the substantial harm to 
patients. At most, the government will require the pharmaceutical manufacturers to 
enter into new CIAs. The problem is the moral hazard that this enforcement reality 
creates. Even when a pharmaceutical manufacturer that is already under a CIA 
engages in off-label promotion of drugs, the government simply waives the 
manufacturer’s liability for violating the existing CIA, imposes an even larger fine, 
and enters into a new CIA.132 Thus, there is little incentive for the manufacturer to 
cease the wrongful conduct as long as the profits from off-label promotion greatly 
exceed the fines.  
The Pfizer story illustrates the issues surrounding the use of successive CIAs. 
Pfizer acquired Warner-Lambert in 2000.133 At the time of the acquisition, Warner-
Lambert was under investigation by the government for off-label marketing of the 
drug Neurontin and had been sued civilly under the FCA.134 In its promotion of 
Neurontin, Warner-Lambert promoted the drug for uses for which it was not 
approved, paid doctors to induce them to promote and prescribe Neurontin for off-
label uses, and made false statements regarding the uses for which the FDA 
approved Neurontin.135 In 2004, OIG settled with Pfizer for $430 million plus 
interest and entered into a CIA whereby OIG agreed not to pursue exclusion from 
Medicare and Medicaid for Pfizer.136 In addition, Warner-Lambert pled guilty to 
violations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a), 331(d), 333(a), 352(f)(1), and 355.137 Because 
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Pfizer had acquired Warner-Lambert, however, the guilty plea did not lead to 
Pfizer’s exclusion from participation in Medicare and Medicaid.138  
The 2004 Pfizer CIA had many of the standard provisions, including, inter alia, 
Pfizer’s agreement to institute voluntary compliance measures such as appointing a 
compliance officer and committee, mandatory training regarding Pfizer’s code of 
conduct, and reporting obligations.139 The CIA required that both the compliance 
officer and the deputy compliance officers be members of senior management who 
make reports directly to the board of directors.140 It further required Pfizer to have 
written policies and procedures regarding compliance with FDA and federal health 
care program requirements. Specifically, it required Pfizer to create, inter alia, a 
policy that conformed to the FDA’s requirements regarding: (1) the method of 
selling and marketing information concerning off-label uses of Pfizer’s products; 
(2) disclosure of financial support of Continuing Medical Education (CME) 
programs; (3) sponsorship of grants; and (4) sponsorship or funding of research 
such as clinical trials.141 The CIA also specified that training should include “all 
applicable Federal health care program requirements” such as the False Claims Act 
and the federal Anti-Kickback Statute.142 Finally, Pfizer was required to retain an 
Independent Review Organization to “assist Pfizer in assessing and evaluating its 
systems, processes, policies and practices related to . . . Promotional and Product 
Services Related Functions.”143 
At the time that Pfizer entered into the CIA with OIG and promised not to 
engage in illegal marketing activities, Pfizer was actively engaged in an extensive 
campaign to market its drug Bextra for off-label uses. Pfizer did not cease its off-
label promotion of Bextra as a result of the 2004 CIA, nor was the illegal 
promotion discovered by the new compliance program. Bextra is a painkiller 
known as a Cox-2 inhibitor144 that Pharmacia & Upjohn Company, Inc. 
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Pfizer/Side%20Letter%20Agreement.pdf. Thus, all allegations in the Information are taken 
as true for the purposes of this Article. 
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(“Pharmacia”) introduced into the market in February 2002.145 Pfizer acquired 
Pharmacia in April 2003, but jointly promoted the drug Bextra with Pharmacia 
prior to the acquisition.146 Pharmacia’s New Drug Application (NDA) for Bextra 
sought approval to promote Bextra for the prevention and treatment of acute pain in 
adults. The Bextra NDA claimed that administering Bextra prior to surgery would 
reduce postsurgical pain.147 In addition, Pharmacia sought approval of Bextra for 
the treatment of primary dysmenorrheal (painful menstrual cramps), osteoarthritis, 
and adult rheumatoid arthritis.148 On November 16, 2001, the FDA approved 
Bextra for the treatment of primary dysmenorrheal, adult rheumatoid arthritis, and 
osteoarthritis.149 The FDA did not approve Bextra for postsurgical pain due to 
safety concerns.150  
Pharmacia’s marketing team promoted Bextra for acute pain, including surgical 
pain, even though the FDA did not approve Bextra for those uses.151 The marketing 
team created materials that directed Pharmacia’s sales force to aggressively pursue 
written surgical and pain management standing orders for Bextra for both approved 
and unapproved uses.152 In addition, the marketing team aggressively distinguished 
Bextra from competitors on the market, such as Pharmacia’s drug, Celebrex, which 
was used for chronic pain conditions, and Merck’s drug Vioxx, another Cox-2 
inhibitor.153 The marketing team created visual aids stating that Bextra was for 
“acute pain” and Celebrex was for “chronic pain.”154 Pharmacia also had its sales 
representatives tell doctors to replace Vioxx with Bextra even though Vioxx was 
approved by the FDA for acute pain and Bextra was not.155 The sales 
representatives also claimed that Bextra was safer and more effective than Vioxx, 
despite the fact that no studies existed to back up the claim.156 In addition, the sales 
representatives told doctors that the cardiovascular concerns that existed with 
Vioxx were specific to Vioxx and not all Cox-2 inhibitors.157 Thus, they convinced 
doctors that there was no proportional increase of hypertension or edema with the 
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use of Bextra, notwithstanding the fact that the label clearly indicated that there was 
a problem.158  
In addition to using the sales force to promote Bextra for off-label uses, 
Pharmacia also promoted Bextra through remuneration to physicians and physician 
consulting arrangements. Pharmacia targeted physicians to participate in advisory 
boards or consultant meetings to transform high-prescribing physicians into 
Pharmacia Cox-2 “advocates.”159 Pharmacia paid the cost of airfare and two-to-
three days’ accommodations at luxury resorts for the influential physicians to 
attend consultant meetings.160 They also paid for recreational activities such as golf 
and spa treatments, and Pharmacia paid doctors from $1000 to $2000 to attend.161 
From late 2001 to late 2003, Pharmacia held approximately 100 consultant 
meetings and promoted unapproved uses of Bextra to over 5000 health care 
professionals.162 Pharmacia also paid these physician advocates to present at 
lunches and dinners where they would promote the drug for unapproved uses.163 
Further, Pharmacia funded CME programs for the purpose of promoting Bextra 
for acute pain and surgical pain. Pharmacia hired advertising agencies to prepare 
promotional slides for Bextra and then had other vendors certify the slides as 
CME.164 The slides were then distributed to the “advocates” so that they could use 
the slides at CME events as well.165 In addition to the slides, Pharmacia initiated, 
funded, sponsored, and sometimes drafted or hired medical writer vendors to write 
articles about Bextra for unapproved uses and dosages in order to promote these 
uses and dosages, without appropriately disclosing Pharmacia’s role in the 
process.166 Pharmacia actually had a “manuscript development” process where it 
planned potential publications and found authors for them. The goal of the process 
was to promote messages such as “Acute Pain: BEXTRA Provides Rapid, Powerful 
Pain Relief in surgical pain.”167 
As was the case with Neurontin, Pfizer’s illegal promotion of Bextra came to 
light because of several whistleblower suits brought under the FCA.168 It was not 
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discovered through the monitoring or compliance efforts that Pfizer undertook as 
part of its 2004 CIA. In the end, the government was either unable or unwilling to 
pull the trigger by taking Pfizer to court and pursuing the remedy of blanket 
exclusion from federal health care programs. Instead, Pfizer and the government 
settled for $2.3 billion and entered into another CIA to replace the CIA that was 
still in effect at the time of the illegal promotional activities.169 As part of the 
settlement with the government, Pfizer created a shell company that was a 
subsidiary of Pharmacia to plead guilty to a felony and be excluded from Medicare 
and Medicaid.170 The shell subsidiary never bought, sold, or marketed a single 
drug. The exclusion was a façade to cover the fact that the government protected 
Pfizer.  
The 2009 Pfizer CIA, much like the 2004 CIA, required Pfizer to have a 
compliance officer and committee. The 2009 CIA, however, forbids Pfizer’s 
general counsel (GC) or chief financial officer (CFO) from being the compliance 
officer.171 It also prohibits the compliance officer from being subordinate to either 
the GC or CFO.172 In addition, the 2009 CIA makes Pfizer’s audit committee 
“responsible for the review and oversight of matters related to compliance with 
Federal health care program requirements, FDA requirements, and the obligations 
of this CIA.”173 As part of its responsibilities, the audit committee must evaluate 
the effectiveness of Pfizer’s compliance program and adopt a resolution 
documenting its review and oversight of the compliance program.174 The 2009 CIA 
also has a “Management Accountability and Certifications” section that requires the 
presidents of Pfizer’s business units and the finance director of each business unit 
within World Pharmaceutical Operations to certify that “the leadership teams of the 
respective [business unit] have taken all appropriate steps to ensure compliance, 
that the leadership team has not directly or indirectly encouraged policy violation, 
and that controls are operating effectively.”175 Thus, the 2009 CIA attempted to 
                                                                                                                 
Agreement.pdf.  
 169. See CIA PFIZER 2009, supra note 102, at 1 (acknowledging 2004 CIA).  
 170. Drew Griffin & Andy Segal, Feds Found Pfizer Too Big To Nail, CNN (Apr. 2, 
2010, 4:44 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/HEALTH/04/02/pfizer.bextra/index.html 
(explaining that the “[p]ublic records show that the subsidiary was incorporated in Delaware 
on March 27, 2007, the same day Pfizer lawyers and federal prosecutors agreed that the 
company would plead guilty in a kickback case against a company Pfizer had acquired a few 
years earlier.”). 
 171. CIA PFIZER 2009, supra note 102, at 4. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 5.  
 174. Id. The CIA states that the resolution must include the following language: 
The Audit Committee has made a reasonable inquiry into the operations of 
Pfizer’s Compliance Program, including but not limited to evaluating its 
effectiveness and receiving updates about the activities of its Chief Compliance 
Officer and other compliance personnel. Based on its inquiry, the Audit 
Committee has concluded that, to the best of its knowledge, Pfizer has 
implemented an effective Compliance Program to meet Federal health care 
program requirements, FDA requirements, and the obligations of the CIA. 
Id. The resolution must be signed by each member of the Audit Committee. Id. 
 175. Id. at 6. The certification must state that the certifying individual: 
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increase accountability for compliance by requiring people higher in the 
organization to certify compliance. Additionally, Pfizer was required to provide 
notice of the settlement for off-label promotion to health care providers and 
entities.176 Pfizer was also required to post on its website a list of all payments 
made to physicians during the term of the CIA.177 
Remarkably, despite the egregious nature of the violations and the fact that they 
were taking place at the same time that Pfizer was entering into the 2004 CIA, the 
government spared Pfizer from the more onerous certification requirements 
imposed on some of its competitors. Unlike Eli Lilly and Cephalon—which entered 
into CIAs in 2008 for off-label promotion of drugs—Pfizer was not required to 
have the CEO certify compliance with the federal health care laws, FDA 
regulations, and the CIA.178 Nor was Pfizer required to plead guilty to a 
misdemeanor misbranding charge, unlike Eli Lilly and Cephalon. Instead, Pfizer 
was allowed to create a shell subsidiary that then went into court, pled guilty to a 
felony misbranding charge, and was excluded from Medicare and Medicaid. Of 
course in each case, the government crafted the guilty plea so as to save the 
pharmaceutical manufacturer from exclusion from Medicare and Medicaid.  
Perhaps the government settled because it was apprehensive about its untested 
theories for finding misbranding violations based on off-label promotion. But if 
there was ever a strong case for such a theory, it was this case. The evidence clearly 
demonstrated that Pfizer was engaging in deceitful promotional activities. This was 
not a case where Pfizer was simply disseminating truthful medical or scientific 
information regarding the off-label uses of its product. Instead, Pfizer was 
promoting its product as if it were safe for uses that the FDA had clearly 
determined were not safe. Thus, it was probably not the uncertainty of a conviction 
                                                                                                                 
1) has reviewed the following: (a) reports from an internal group within Pfizer 
formed to conduct promotional quality assessments; (b) summary reports of 
speaker programs, advisory boards, consultant payments, travel; and 
entertainment expenses; (c) sales compensation exclusion criteria; and (d) 
corporate compliance group statistics; and 
2) is currently aware of no violations of law, regulation, Pfizer policy, or the 
CIA requirements; or, 
3) in the event that a potential issue has been identified, the certifying 
individual has referred the potential violations to the Corporate Compliance 
Group or a member of the Pfizer legal division for further review and follow 
up. The certification shall also state that the signatory understands that 
certification is being provided to and relied upon by the United States. 
Id. 
 176. Id. at 35–36.  
 177. CIA PFIZER 2009, supra note 102, at 36–38. Payments under the agreement include 
all payments “made in connection with physicians serving as speakers, participating in 
speaker training, or serving as Consultants or Authors; payments or compensation for 
services rendered; grants; fees; payments relating to research; payments relating to 
education; and payment or reimbursement for food, entertainment, gifts, trips or travel, 
product(s)/item(s) provided for less than fair market value, or other economic benefit paid or 
transferred.” Id. at 38. 
 178. See CIA CEPHALON, supra note 111, at 6 (requiring certification by the CEO and 
Chairman); CIA ELI LILLY, supra note 111, at 6–7 (requiring certification by President and 
CEO). 
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that kept this case out of court. It is more likely that the government settled with the 
pharmaceutical giant and entered into another CIA because it was concerned about 
the collateral consequences for Pfizer, its employees, and millions of patients.  
It is also possible that the government was motivated by financial 
considerations. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
(HIPAA) established a national Health Care Fraud and Abuse Program under the 
joint direction of the Attorney General and the Secretary of HHS, acting through 
OIG.179 Under this program, the DOJ and OIG can use their civil and criminal fraud 
recoveries to expand their budgets, staff, and authority.180 HIPAA requires that an 
amount equaling recoveries from health care investigations—including criminal 
fines, forfeitures, civil settlements and judgments, and administrative penalties, but 
excluding restitution and compensation to the victim agency—be deposited in the 
Medicare Trust Fund.181 HIPAA then appropriates monies from the Medicare Trust 
Fund in amounts that the Secretary of HHS and Attorney General jointly certify as 
necessary to finance antifraud activities.182 In 2006, the Tax Relief and Health Care 
Act (TRHCA) amended HIPAA so that funds allotted from the account are 
available until expended.183 TRHCA also allowed for yearly increases to the 
account based on the change in the consumer price index for all urban consumers. 
During fiscal year 2009, the DOJ and OIG certified $266,425,206 in mandatory 
funding for appropriation to the account.184 Additionally, Congress appropriated 
$198 million in discretionary funding.185 By settling with the pharmaceutical 
companies rather than taking them to court, OIG is guaranteed a large cut of the 
settlements. Further, the threat of blanket exclusion is enough to transform a 
questionable fraud case into a multimillion dollar settlement.  
The government’s motivations for entering into a CIA with Pfizer in 2009 are 
not completely clear. What is clear, however, is that the government’s use of 
successive CIAs with Pfizer rather than exclusion is not an isolated incident. In 
2005, Eli Lilly paid $36 million and entered into a consent decree with the 
government to settle charges related to its off-label promotion of its osteoporosis 
drug Evista for the prevention of breast cancer.186 The FDA had approved Evista 
for osteoporosis but rejected it for the prevention of breast cancer.187 The consent 
                                                                                                                 
 
 179. See THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AND THE DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL 
YEAR 2009 3–4 (May 2010) [hereinafter FRAUD & ABUSE REPORT 2009], available at 
http://oig.hhs.gov/publications/ docs/hcfac/hcfacreport2009.pdf. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 303 120 Stat. 2922, 2949–50 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 
233). 
 184. See FRAUD & ABUSE REPORT 2009, supra note 179, at 3–4 (describing the process). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Eli Lilly and Company to Pay U.S. $36 Million Relating to Off-Label Promotion, 
supra note 6. 
 187. Two years after the settlement, the FDA approved Evista for the prevention of breast 
cancer. Press Release, Eli Lilly, FDA Approves Lilly’s Osteoporosis Drug EVISTA® 
(raloxifene HCl) to Reduce The Risk of Invasive Breast Cancer in Two Populations of 
Postmenopausal Women (Sep. 14, 2007), available at http://newsroom.lilly.com/ 
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decree had many of the provisions common in CIAs, including certification 
requirements, training requirements, and review by an IRO.188 Eli Lilly pled guilty 
to a misdemeanor misbranding charge, which did not lead to exclusion from 
Medicare and Medicaid.189 In 2009, Eli Lilly paid $1.415 billion and entered into a 
CIA with the government to settle charges related to its off-label promotion of 
Zyprexa.190 As previously mentioned, the 2009 Eli Lilly CIA requires certifications 
of compliance by the company’s president and CEO.191 Eli Lilly also pled guilty to 
a misdemeanor misbranding charge as part of the agreement, again not leading to 
exclusion of the drug maker from Medicare and Medicaid.192  
In 2005, Novartis Pharmaceuticals entered into a CIA due to its payment of 
kickbacks involving nutritional products.193 Its subsidiary, OPI Products, pled 
guilty and was excluded from Medicare and Medicaid.194 In May of 2010, Novartis 
settled with the government for $72.5 million to resolve false claims allegations 
concerning its drug TOBI.195 There was no CIA or admission of guilt involved in 
the settlement.196 Later that same year, in September of 2010, Novartis settled with 
the government for $422.5 million for off-label promotion of its drug Trileptal and 
entered into a CIA.197 As part of the CIA, Novartis was required to have the 
president of Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation (NPC) and head pharma, North 
America, executive vice president and North American region head, oncology, and 
many other executive vice presidents certify compliance with the federal health 
care laws and FDA regulations.198 Novartis Pharmaceuticals, a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Novartis, pled guilty to a felony misbranding charge and was 
excluded from Medicare and Medicaid, sparing its parent Novartis from 
exclusion.199  
                                                                                                                 
releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=264036.  
 188. Consent Decree of Permanent Injunction, U.S. v. Eli Lilly and Company (2005) (on 
file with author). 
 189. Information, U.S. v. Eli Lilly and Company (2005) (on file with the author).  
 190. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Pharmaceutical Company Eli Lilly to Pay 
Record $1.415 Billion for Off-Label Drug Marketing (Jan. 15, 2009), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/pae/News/Pr/2009/jan/lillyrelease.pdf.  
 191. CIA ELI LILLY, supra note 111, at 6–7.  
 192. Information, United States v. Eli Lilly & Co., (E.D. Pa. 2009), 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/pae/News/2009/jan/lillyinfo.pdf. 
 193. THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AND THE DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2005 
16 (Aug. 2006) [hereinafter FRAUD AND ABUSE CONTROL REPORT FY 2005], available at 
http://oig.hhs.gov/publications/docs/hcfac/hcfacreport2005.pdf. 
 194. Id. at 15.  
 195. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Novartis Vaccines & Diagnostics to Pay More 
than $72 Million to Resolve False Claims Allegations Concerning TOBI (May 4, 2010), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ 2010/May/10-civ-522.html. 
 196. See id. 
 197. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation to Pay 
$422.5 Million for Off-Label Drug Marketing (Sept. 30, 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/pae/Pharma-Device/novartis_release.pdf. 
 198. CIA CEPHALON, supra note 111, at 7–8. 
 199. Information, United States v. Novartis Pharm., (E.D. Pa. 2010), 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/pae/Pharma-Device/novartis_information.pdf. 
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In 2004, Schering Sales Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Schering-
Plough Corporation, pled guilty, entered into a CIA, and paid $52.5 million to settle 
charges related to a kickback arrangement involving its drug Claritin.200 In 2006, 
Schering-Plough Corporation paid $435 million to settle civil and criminal charges 
related to kickbacks and off-label promotion of its drugs Temodar and Intron A.201 
To settle the criminal charges, Schering Sales Corporation pled guilty to one count 
of criminal conspiracy to make false statements to the FDA regarding illegal 
promotional activities.202 Schering Sales was subsequently excluded from 
participation in Medicare and Medicaid.203 Schering-Plough’s 2004 CIA was 
amended to require the manufacturer “to continue extensive work that the 
Company has undertaken in the last two years to monitor and correct the 
shortcomings in Schering’s drug sales, marketing and pricing activities.”204 In 
addition, there are other pharmaceutical companies that have entered into CIAs to 
resolve claims of off-label promotion or kickbacks that are currently under 
investigation for marketing violations.205  
On the one hand, the government is using the threat of exclusion to win large 
settlements and get sweeping reforms in CIAs. On the other hand, the government 
is unwilling to go to court, obtain a conviction, and exclude a pharmaceutical 
manufacturer because the harm to the company, its shareholders, and, most 
importantly, its patients, would be too great. As the prosecutor in the Pfizer case 
                                                                                                                 
 
 200. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. AND DEP’T OF JUSTICE HEALTH CARE FRAUD 
AND ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2004 (2004), available at 
http://oig.hhs.gov/publications/docs/hcfac/hcfacreport2004.htm.  
 201. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Schering to Pay $435 Million for the Improper 
Marketing of Drugs and Medicaid Fraud (Aug. 29, 2006), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/ma/news/Schering-Plough/press%20release.pdf. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id.; ADDENDUM TO CORPORATE INTEGRITY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE OFFICE OF 
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AND SCHERING-
PLOUGH CORP. (Aug. 25, 2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/ma/news/Schering-
Plough/Integrity%20Agreement.pdf. In 2009, Merck purchased Schering-Plough. See David 
Jolly, Merck Agrees to Acquire Schering-Plough for $41 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/09/business/worldbusiness/09iht-drug.html. Merck is no 
stranger to CIAs. Merck paid the government $650 million and entered into a CIA for its 
illegal kickback scheme involving the drugs Zocor and Vioxx in 2008. Press Release, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Merck to Pay More than $650 Million to Resolve Claims of Fraudulent 
Price Reporting and Kickbacks (Feb. 7, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/ 
pr/2008/February/08_civ_094.html.  
 205. For example, in 2010 Johnson & Johnson’s subsidiary, Ortho-McNeil-Janssen 
Pharmaceuticals, entered into a CIA and paid $81 million to resolve allegations that it 
promoted its drug Topamax for off-label uses. Ortho-McNeil Janssen Pharmaceuticals is also 
currently under investigation for off-label promotion of its drug Risperdal. See CORPORATE 
INTEGRITY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT 
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AND ORTHO-MCNEIL-JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. 
(2010), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/agreements/ortho_mcneil_janssen_ 
04282010.pdf; Margaret Cronin Fisk & David Voreacos, J&J Unit Marketed Risperdal Off-
Label, Ex-Workers Say (Update2), BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 6, 2009, 4:46 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=akvy0MGjJcGY. 
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said, the payment of large fines for off-label marketing is simply “a cost of doing 
business.”206 The same could be said about hiring a compliance officer and 
enacting an extensive compliance program. A pharmaceutical company can make 
billions in sales from marketing a drug for off-label uses over the course of several 
years. In the event that the drug manufacturer gets caught, it pays a fine that is only 
a fraction of the revenue that it earned through its illegal marketing practices.207 
Pfizer’s experience with the drug Neurontin is telling. In the year 2000 alone, 
Neurontin earned $2.3 billion, and 78% of Neurontin prescriptions (approximately 
$1.8 billion) were for off-label uses.208 The settlement for Neurontin was $430 
million.209  
So long as the revenue from marketing a drug for off-label uses eclipses the fine 
to be imposed for the illegal practice, the pharmaceutical manufacturers will 
continue to engage in illegal marketing activities. Indeed, the fine can never truly 
match the profits generated because not all of the off-label prescriptions are 
reimbursed by Medicare and Medicaid and the government can only recover what 
they were defrauded. The trend is disturbing because of the message that it sends to 
pharmaceutical manufacturers—it is permissible to deceive the public about the 
safety and efficacy of your drugs because you will not be excluded from Medicare 
and Medicaid so long as you are willing to pay a fraction of your profits to the 
government and enter into a CIA. Indeed, repeat offender Pfizer is so sure of that 
proposition that it recently acquired Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, despite the fact that 
Wyeth is under investigation for off-label promotion of its kidney drug 
Rapamune.210 
                                                                                                                 
 
 206. John Loucks, who was the prosecutor in the Pfizer case regarding off-label 
promotion of Bextra, explained that the money to be earned from off-label promotion “is so 
great” that pharmaceutical companies may consider any fines paid to the government as a 
business cost. Griffin & Segal, supra note 170; see also George S. Craft, Jr., Comment, 
Promoting Off-Label in Pursuit of Profit: An Examination of a Fraudulent Business Model, 
8 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 103, 105 (2007) (“Off-label promotion can be an extremely 
profitable and common marketing strategy for pharmaceutical companies.”). 
 207. SAMMY ALMASHAT & TIMOTHY WATERMAN, PUB. CITIZEN’S HEALTH RESEARCH 
GRP., RAPIDLY INCREASING CRIMINAL AND CIVIL MONETARY PENALTIES AGAINST THE 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: 1991 TO 2010, at 21 (2010), available at 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/rapidlyincreasingcriminalandcivilpenalties.pdf (“Thus, 
these financial penalties, although increasing, remain a very small fraction of company net 
profits and therefore do not provide a sufficient deterrent against further violations.”). 
 208. Melody Petersen, Pfizer Nears Drug Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2003), 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/cyberlaw2005/sites/cyberlaw2005/images/Neurontin_NYTimes
_Article.pdf.  
 209. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Warner-Lambert to Pay $430 Million to 
Resolve Criminal & Civil Health Care Liability Relating to Off-Label Promotion (May 13, 
2004),  available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2004/May/04_civ_322.htm. 
 210. Duff Wilson, U.S. Joins Pfizer Suit over Drug’s Marketing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 
2010, at B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/22/business/22drug.html.  
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B. Theories of Punishment 
The crucial issue is whether CIAs are an effective remedy for pharmaceutical 
manufacturers’ marketing violations. By entering into a CIA, the manufacturer is 
able to safeguard its business and largely escape corporate criminal liability and the 
collateral consequences that flow from it. In particular, manufacturers are spared 
from exclusion. Thus, an examination of criminal liability and exclusion as 
compared to CIAs is integral to the question of the effectiveness of CIAs.  
Corporations are vicariously liable for the criminal acts of their employees if the 
employees were acting (1) within the scope of their employment and (2) for the 
benefit of the corporation.211 Thus, there is no doubt that if a sales person’s 
promotion of drugs for off-label use is criminal, then a pharmaceutical 
manufacturer would be held criminally responsible for that conduct, because drug 
sales are within the employee’s scope of employment and the company would 
benefit from the increased sales. It would not matter for purposes of the 
manufacturer’s liability if the sales person engaged in off-label promotion to 
increase her own commissions or if her actions were contrary to company policy.212 
Although scholars have rightfully criticized both the existence of and the standards 
for imposing corporate criminal liability,213 it is a doctrine that is unlikely to change 
in the near future. Thus, this Article takes the notion of corporate criminal liability 
and the current standard as a given. This Part will examine both the goals of 
corporate criminal punishment and the goals of the statutorily provided health care 
                                                                                                                 
 
 211. Corporations are fictional persons that may only act through their agents. A 
corporation is liable for the criminal acts of its employee if the individual acted within the 
scope of employment and with the intent to benefit the corporation. Katrice Bridges 
Copeland, Preserving the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1199, 
1201 (2010).  
 212. See id.; United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 138 F.3d 961 (D.C. Cir. 
1998) (upholding firm’s conviction despite the fact that the firm was also defrauded by its 
agent’s scheme); United States v. Hilton Hotels Co., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1972) 
(“[A] corporation is liable for acts of its agents within the scope of their authority even when 
done against company orders.”).  
 213. See, e.g., Miriam Hechler Baer, Insuring Corporate Crime, 83 IND. L.J. 1035 (2008) 
(arguing that corporate criminal liability should be eliminated and replaced with an insurance 
system that would cover civil-related penalties associated with individual employees’ 
criminal conduct); Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Criminal Liability: When Does It Make 
Sense?, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1437 (2009) (arguing that an effective compliance program 
should be an affirmative defense to corporate criminal liability); John Hasnas, The 
Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 1329 (2009) (arguing that there is no theoretical justification for corporate criminal 
liability); Barry J. Pollack, Time to Stop Living Vicariously: A Better Approach to Corporate 
Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1393 (2009) (arguing that corporations should only 
be held criminally liable for the acts of their employees when those acts manifest the 
collective criminal intent of the corporation); Andrew Weissman, A New Approach to 
Corporate Criminal Liability, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1319 (2007) (arguing that, to establish 
corporate criminal liability, the government should have to show that the corporation did not 
have an effective compliance program).  
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fraud criminal punishments, and whether those goals can be reached through the 
use of civil administrative settlements (in this case, CIAs).  
1. Justification for Corporate Criminal Liability 
There are many policy reasons for holding corporations criminally liable for the 
acts of their employees. One justification that has been advanced by Professor 
Pamela Bucy is that corporations should be subject to criminal liability because 
they take actions that have the potential to harm many people.214 The act of 
promoting drugs for unsafe uses, for example, could potentially harm millions of 
patients. Patients could suffer adverse consequences or even die if drugs are used 
improperly. Because criminal prosecution is the strongest sanction that we have, it 
should be imposed on any societal actor that engages in misconduct with the 
potential to harm many people.215  
Second, Professor Bucy argues that “corporations pose unique opportunities for 
unlawful behavior to occur.”216 As a result, it is more difficult to control 
organizations than it is to control individuals who are working outside of the 
corporate form.217 Criminal activity can flourish within a corporation due to group 
dynamics putting pressure on individuals to acquiesce in the wrongdoing. 218 
Indeed, as Professor Samuel Buell has explained, “pressures on the individual in 
the group setting can make it extremely difficult to recognize, reveal, or stop 
harmful behavior once it begins.”219 In addition, criminal activity can prosper 
within a corporation because the corporate form may make it difficult to detect 
violations of the law.220  
Another key justification for corporate criminal liability is that it encourages 
corporations to monitor their employees and punish them for any misconduct. As 
Professor John Hasnas explains, because the current standard for corporate criminal 
liability has such a low threshold, “organizations can avoid criminal liability only 
by preventing their employees from violating the law.”221 But this goal can only be 
                                                                                                                 
 
 214. Bucy, supra note 213, at 1437.  
 215. Id.  
 216. Id.  
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. Due to group dynamics, individuals may “suspend their own judgment and 
disregard their usual sense of caution. Because of the pressure to hold on to a job, or please 
the boss and coworkers, the workplace presents especially strong temptations to ‘go along.’” 
Id. at 1437–38.  
 219. Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 
473, 496 (2006). Professor Buell explains that “[a]n institutional actor who commits a first, 
perhaps small violation of a norm or rule is likely to rationalize the violation to herself in 
order to avoid signaling guilt and insecurity to peers and supervisors. Incrementally worse 
violations will be equally rationalized in order to maintain cognitive consistency. As the 
seriousness of violations increases, the actor may eventually appreciate the depth of her 
predicament and take increasing risks, causing greater harm, in order to avoid detection of 
what began as a minor transgression.” Id. 
 220. Bucy, supra note 213, at 1437. 
 221.  John Hasnas, Ethics and the Problem of White Collar Crime, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 
579, 639 (2005). 
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achieved if the corporation engages in information gathering and “intense” 
monitoring of all actions those employees take within the scope of their 
employment.222  
2. Justifications for Criminal Punishment 
There are two basic justifications for criminal punishment—utilitarian and 
retributivist. The utilitarian, or “consequentialist,” justification for punishment is 
based on the future benefits it will provide.223 The future benefit most often 
mentioned is deterrence. Thus, punishment is beneficial if it helps to prevent future 
crimes.224 A retributivist, or “just deserts” view, on the other hand asserts that 
punishment is valuable in and of itself if it gives the wrongdoer what she deserves 
for prior misconduct.225 Thus, a utilitarian punishes because of the future benefit 
and a retributivist punishes because it is morally right to do so. Therefore, many 
scholars consider these two views of punishment to be diametrically opposed.226 
This Article will focus on utilitarianism because it is the stated goal of both the 
exclusion statute and the justification for CIAs. 
Utilitarianism is concerned with reducing crime while minimizing societal 
costs.227 Negative societal costs include the crime itself, increased fear in others, 
the impact on the victim of the crime, crime prevention, crime enforcement, and the 
pain that the criminal endures due to the punishment.228 On the other hand, society 
benefits from punishment when it deters future criminal conduct.229 Deterrence has 
two aspects—general deterrence and specific deterrence. Punishment furthers 
general deterrence when the threat of punishment deters potential offenders in the 
general community.230 Punishment also furthers specific deterrence when punishing 
a convicted defendant makes that defendant less likely to engage in future crime.231 
Under the economic theory of criminal law, an individual will be deterred from 
engaging in criminal conduct when the individual “feel[s] ‘costs’ equivalent to the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 222. Id.  
 223. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U.L. REV. 453, 
454 (1997). 
 224. See id. 
 225. Id. at 454.  
 226. Id. As Robinson and Darby explain, the debate over the justification for punishing 
criminals has a long history. Although Jeremy Bentham is credited with announcing the 
deterrence theory of punishment and Immanuel Kant is credited with the “just deserts” 
theory of punishment, the justifications can be traced back to Plato and Aristotle, 
respectively. Id. at 455. 
 227. Erik Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception of 
Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 205, 208 (2003) (“The primary consequentialist 
theory—utilitarianism—imposes criminal penalties only to the extent that social benefits 
(utility) outweigh the costs of punishment.”).  
 228. Carl Emigholz, Note, Utilitarianism, Retributivism and the White Collar-Drug 
Crime Sentencing Disparity: Toward a Unified Theory of Enforcement, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 
583, 599 (2006). 
 229. Id.  
 230. Luna, supra note 227, at 209. 
 231. Id. 
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harm they cause society, modified by the probability that they will be punished.”232 
Thus, the individual will decide not to engage in criminal conduct when the costs of 
committing the crime outweigh the net benefits of doing so.233 The costs of 
engaging in criminal conduct include both the punishment that the individual will 
receive upon conviction and the harm to the individual’s reputation.234 In the 
corporate context, there are other collateral consequences of conviction, such as the 
loss of government contracts, suspension and debarment, and exclusion from 
federal health care programs.235 
Deterrence can be achieved through increasing either the likelihood of detection 
or the severity of punishment.236 In order for deterrence to be effective, however, 
the potential criminal must understand the threat of punishment, which means 
weighing the potential benefits of the crime against the chance of being caught, the 
chance of being convicted, and the severity of punishment.237 Corporate actors are 
viewed as deterrable because they regularly engage in cost/benefit analyses when 
making business decisions.238 The difficulty lies in the fact that many offenders, 
particularly in the white collar context, may be “unrealistically optimistic about the 
precautions they take to avoid being caught, or the simple likelihood of being 
caught, and thus may underestimate that probability.”239 Further, potential criminals 
often discount the cost of punishment because they believe that if they are actually 
convicted, any punishment will take place in the distant future.240 This concern is 
heightened in the health care fraud context due to the multi-year investigations that 
precede any imposed sanction. The question is: at what point does an increase in 
the cost of punishment equal the corresponding reduction in benefits from that 
cost?241  
If one ascribes to neoclassical criminal law and economics, then the criminal 
sanction should be set roughly at the value of the harm caused by the defendant 
adjusted for the probability of her punishment.242 Because sanctions and harm are 
not always monetary in nature, the government sanction may not precisely replicate 
the harm the defendant causes, even if one accounts for the probability of detection 
and punishment.243 As such, there may be an over- or under-deterrence problem 
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associated with the government-chosen sanction. If an individual is over-deterred 
by the government sanction, she will be risk averse. In the corporate context, this 
can lead to increased costs and lost business opportunities.244 On the other hand, if 
an individual is under-deterred by the government-set sanction, she will commit 
more crimes and cause more harm to society because she does not view the 
sanction as an impediment. In the corporate setting, under-deterrence can be even 
more detrimental because of the potential for harmful conduct to impact a greater 
number of people.245 Thus, it is important to strike the correct balance in punishing 
corporations. 
3. The Exclusion Provision and Deterrence 
The overarching purpose of the five-year mandatory exclusion period is 
remedial in nature. As the Senate Finance Committee Report states:  
The basic purpose of the [Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program 
Protection Act] is to improve the ability of the Secretary and the 
Inspector General of [HHS] to protect Medicare, Medicaid, [and other 
social services programs] from fraud and abuse, and to protect the 
beneficiaries of those programs from incompetent practitioners and 
from inappropriate or inadequate care.246 
The committee report also states, however, that the law “should provide a clear and 
strong deterrent against the commission of criminal acts.”247 On its face, the 
exclusion provision applies both to individual doctors and to manufacturers. 
a. Exclusion of Doctors 
When it comes to individual doctors and medical practices, the exclusion 
remedy is an effective deterrent against the commission of health care fraud. 
Doctors who commit health care fraud often engage in practices that result in 
Medicare and Medicaid being overcharged for medical services, such as overbilling 
for services performed, performing and billing for unnecessary procedures, billing 
for services that have not been provided, and billing for patients who do not 
exist.248 In addition, physicians can be convicted of health care fraud for taking 
kickbacks on prescriptions or referrals.249 Because billing practices are 
complicated, it is difficult to detect violations, which makes the likelihood of 
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detection low.250 When doctors are caught committing health care fraud, however, 
OIG has not shied away from invoking the exclusion remedy.251  
The exclusion of a doctor from Medicare and Medicaid can have a far reaching 
impact on the doctor. An excluded doctor can no longer be reimbursed for treating 
Medicare or Medicaid patients. Thus, the doctor would have to stop treating 
Medicare and Medicaid patients. In some situations, the doctor will lose his or her 
license due to the fraudulent activities and will need to close the practice. Although 
patients will potentially be harmed by a disruption in treatment, patients can switch 
to non-excluded doctors to receive treatment.252 The punishment of exclusion is 
exceptionally high, but it is appropriate because the chance of detection is very low.  
More importantly, the exclusion remedy is vigorously enforced against doctors. 
In fiscal year 2009, 2556 individuals and entities were excluded from Medicare and 
Medicaid; 1057 of those exclusions resulted from criminal convictions for 
program-related crimes, 239 for patient abuse and neglect, and 895 based on license 
revocations.253 Thus, even if the likelihood of detection is not exceptionally high, 
once fraud is detected, the likelihood of exclusion is high. Because the exclusion 
remedy is regularly applied to doctors, it has the ability to deter physicians from 
engaging in health care fraud. As the government regularly excludes doctors who 
engage in health care fraud, doctors may begin to associate the punishment of 
exclusion with the act of overbilling Medicare and Medicaid, and will constrain 
their conduct even if they are not sure they will be caught.  
b. CIAs Replace Exclusion of Pharmaceutical Companies 
In the case of the exclusion provisions, it seems that blanket exclusion from 
federal health care programs would be a remedy that would over-deter 
pharmaceutical manufacturers. Under the threat of blanket exclusion, one would 
think that pharmaceutical companies would be overly cautious about off-label 
promotion and would not even engage in activities that are probably permissible 
under the statute, such as distributing truthful and non-misleading medical and 
scientific information regarding off-label uses, due to fear that if they were 
overzealous in promotion, they would be excluded from Medicare and Medicaid. 
One would also think that the exclusion remedy would lead manufacturers to 
monitor their employees to make sure that they are not committing any marketing 
violations that would lead to exclusion of the manufacturer. Ironically, the opposite 
has occurred. For years, pharmaceutical manufacturers have engaged in egregious 
violations of the laws regarding off-label promotion of drugs by promoting the 
drugs for purposes that the scientific data does not support. This is largely due to 
both under-enforcement of the blanket exclusion remedy against pharmaceutical 
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manufacturers and the low likelihood of detection.254 Understandably, the 
government also has been unwilling to inflict harm on innocent patients and 
employees through its pursuit of blanket exclusion of pharmaceutical 
manufacturers.255 The government has replaced the blanket exclusion remedy with 
CIAs, thereby undermining the statutory scheme created by Congress to deter 
Medicare and Medicaid participants from engaging in health care fraud.  
“[D]eterrence is a function of both the sanction level and the probability that it 
will be imposed.”256 The five-year exclusionary period that was meant to remedy 
and deter has been replaced with the five-year CIA that is meant to create 
“structural reform.”257 If one subscribes to utilitarianism, the substitution makes 
some logical sense. Under utilitarianism, criminal penalties will only be imposed to 
the point where social benefits outweigh the costs of punishment.258 In this 
situation, the government has determined that the costs to patients, employees, and 
shareholders that would result from excluding pharmaceutical manufacturers from 
Medicare and Medicaid outweigh the social benefit of punishing pharmaceutical 
manufacturers.  
Indeed, the cost of exclusion will not be captured entirely by the manufacturer. 
The reality is that the cost will “spill over” onto innocent third parties.259 As 
Professor John Coffee explains, “when the corporation catches a cold, someone 
else sneezes.”260 Professor Coffee has identified four levels of harm from spillover.  
First, the penalty is passed on to stockholders who will see a reduction in the 
value of their securities.261 Arguably, the stockholders also benefited from the 
increase in stock prices that came along with the unlawful activities. Nevertheless, 
a drop in stock price after exclusion would likely be devastating to stockholders.  
Second, the penalty impacts bond and credit holders who will also see a decline 
in the value of the securities that secure the investments.262 A large pharmaceutical 
company that has been excluded from Medicare and Medicaid due to illegal 
marketing activities and has thereby lost Medicare and Medicaid revenue for the 
period of exclusion will likely be a riskier investment than a smaller non-excluded 
manufacturer.  
Third, if the penalty is severe and jeopardizes the solvency of the company, the 
penalty harms innocent employees who had no involvement in the inappropriate 
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conduct.263 This is likely due to the fact that the corporation may be forced to fire 
employees to save money. Exclusion would lead to the loss of billions of dollars in 
revenue that would inevitably lead to a reduction in production and work force.264 
Fourth, Professor Coffee explains that consumers will bear the brunt of the 
penalty in the form of higher prices for goods.265 Even though the prices of 
pharmaceutical drugs are often negotiated with health care plans through pharmacy 
benefit managers and may not be able to be changed right away, in all likelihood 
manufacturers would attempt to raise the prices of their drugs to compensate for the 
loss in revenue from Medicare and Medicaid. Consumers will pay the higher prices 
for essential drugs without a close substitute because their demand for drugs is 
somewhat inelastic to price.266 In the event that there is a close competitor on the 
market, consumers may still pay the high prices rather than encountering any 
switching costs that may result from obtaining a new prescription and dealing with 
any side effects of the competitor drug. More importantly, the Medicare and 
Medicaid patients with prescriptions for drugs manufactured by an excluded 
company would suffer severe consequences. Without Medicare or Medicaid to pay 
for their drugs, patients would need to switch to a competitor product (if one is on 
the market) or pay for the drugs themselves. If they could afford the drugs, they 
probably would not be on Medicare or Medicaid in the first place.  
A lesser penalty makes sense in this situation because the penalty of exclusion 
will exceed the harm inflicted by manufacturers and, more importantly, innocent 
third parties will suffer undue harm. It is not clear, however, that CIAs are an 
effective deterrent for pharmaceutical manufacturers that engage in illegal 
promotional activities. To begin with, CIAs are watered down versions of deferred 
prosecution agreements (DPAs). DPAs are used when the prosecutor and the 
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corporation agree that the prosecutor will not seek immediate criminal action in 
exchange for the corporation’s agreement to a specific set of terms laid out in the 
DPA.267 In most cases, the corporation will admit guilt to the criminal conduct in 
the DPA and agree to hire monitors that have “sweeping powers to gather 
information, promulgate policies, and oversee compliance.”268 The federal 
prosecutor will file a formal charging document simultaneously with the DPA. If 
the prosecutor finds that the corporation has complied with all of the conditions of 
the DPA over the specified time period, the prosecutor will withdraw the formal 
charging document.269 If the corporation violates the DPA, however, the 
government will pursue criminal conviction of the corporation (which will be easy 
to obtain due to the admission of guilt in the DPA).270 Thus, DPAs should be 
effective in accomplishing specific deterrence of the corporation. It is in the 
corporation’s best interest to avoid repeating the criminal conduct during the term 
of the agreement. The government has not shied away from prosecuting 
corporations that violate the terms of DPAs.271 The ability of DPAs to promote 
general deterrence is less clear because even though the government often issues 
press releases touting the DPAs, the agreements are not always made publicly 
available, nor are they accessible in one central location.272 Further, when 
corporations hire monitors as part of a DPA, the monitors are not required to make 
their findings regarding potential problems or compliance measures at the 
corporations public.273 Thus, it is not easy for other corporations to determine what 
conduct the government has determined to be unlawful and to conform their 
conduct accordingly. Government regulators and scholars have widely questioned 
whether DPAs, with their focus on monitors and compliance programs, are 
effective at general deterrence.274  
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CIAs are less stringent than DPAs because manufacturers are not required to 
admit guilt to criminal charges and the threat of criminal punishment for violating 
the agreement does not loom over the manufacturer. Thus, the CIA’s effectiveness 
as a specific deterrent is lessened by the fact that criminal liability is not a real 
threat for the manufacturer even if it violates the CIA. Certainly, CIAs instruct 
manufacturers to monitor their employees. The mere fact that manufacturers must 
certify compliance with the requirements of the CIA, however, does little to 
encourage active monitoring because there is no threat of criminal liability or other 
increased sanctions for the drug maker if it fails to comply with the agreement. 
Indeed, as Pfizer, Novartis, Eli Lilly, and others have learned, the punishment for 
multiple offenses is simply another CIA and another fine. The government has 
repeatedly shown its unwillingness to raise the stakes for manufacturers by holding 
them criminally liable and using the exclusion remedy. Instead, if the government 
does decide to impose criminal liability, it crafts the guilty pleas to ensure that the 
drug makers go unharmed.  
Although CIAs have the potential to promote general deterrence, the 
government’s use of them frustrates that potential. CIAs have some ability to 
promote general deterrence in that they are made public and posted on the OIG 
website.275 Because enforcement actions are the principal method of developing the 
law, making the CIAs public allows pharmaceutical companies to learn about the 
conduct the government judges to be unlawful and the specified remedy. Thus, 
pharmaceutical companies can view the requirements of another manufacturer’s 
CIA and decide to abandon any behavior that is similar to the conduct engaged in 
by that manufacturer. Manufacturers could also decide to engage in lawful behavior 
because they fear the onerous conditions of the CIA. Further, drug manufacturers 
may choose to enact compliance programs modeled on the programs included in 
the CIAs. Ultimately, however, CIAs fail as a replacement for blanket exclusion, 
because the government has demonstrated that even if a pharmaceutical company 
violates the provisions of a CIA, it will waive the violation and enter into another 
CIA with the manufacturer. This is in sharp contrast to the government’s reaction 
to the violation of a DPA, which leads to criminal charges. Because the penalty for 
one, two, or even three more marketing violations is still just a CIA, the penalty 
itself does not work to provide additional deterrence. This is particularly true 
because the second or third time that a pharmaceutical company enters into a CIA, 
it will not have to make a huge financial outlay to enact a compliance program or 
comply with government reporting requirements, because those programs already 
exist.276 While successive CIAs might increase the reporting requirements, it is 
unlikely that large scale restructuring of the organization will be required. The 
government’s method of increasing the severity of the penalty on the second CIA—
requiring the pharmaceutical company to designate a subsidiary, which has never 
bought, sold, or marketed a single drug, to go into court to plead guilty and be 
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excluded from Medicare and Medicaid—has little impact on the manufacturer.277 
Thus, the government’s failure to enforce the CIAs only further lessens the ability 
of CIAs to deter drug manufacturers. The end result is that drug manufacturers are 
underdeterred from engaging in off-label marketing.278  
CIAs are an inadequate deterrent for pharmaceutical companies because the 
fines imposed by and the costs of complying with them are too low in comparison 
with the profits that can be gained from engaging in off-label promotion. The cost 
of the crime—a CIA plus a fine—is simply not high enough to deter drug 
manufacturers from committing the crime.  
III. ALTERNATIVES TO CIAS 
The remedy of blanket exclusion is often used against doctors but seldom used 
against large pharmaceutical manufacturers, because, when it comes to 
pharmaceutical manufacturers, the resulting harm to innocent patients from 
exclusion is too great to justify imposition of the sanction. In place of exclusion, 
the government has employed an enforcement strategy aimed at financial recovery 
and organizational reform. Simply recouping large sums of money from 
pharmaceutical manufacturers and requiring compliance programs, however, does 
little to deter them from engaging in fraudulent activities in the future. This Part 
examines alternatives to CIAs, including required funding for clinical trials, 
compulsory licensing, corporate officer liability, and a more targeted exclusion 
remedy. The appropriate choice among these alternatives depends on the harm that 
the government is trying to combat. Some of the possibilities include the failure to 
perform clinical research, defrauding the government, and unjust enrichment. No 
matter what the identifiable harm may be, however, it is important that any remedy 
be a deterrent for future misconduct. The appropriate choice among the alternatives 
will ultimately depend on the circumstances of the violation.  
A. Funding of Clinical Trials 
If the tangible harm from off-label promotion is that the public will be deprived 
of an important commodity, namely clinical research on the off-label claim, then 
one possible remedy is to require that the manufacturer fund clinical trials on the 
off-label claim. This remedy could potentially be added to CIAs. Thus, in addition 
to any fine and compliance measures, the CIA would require the manufacturer to 
provide money to the National Institutes of Health (NIH) to fund clinical trials. 
This remedy would have the potential to greatly aid the public because there would 
be definitive proof to either support or rebut the claim that the drug is safe for the 
off-label use.  
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If the FDA does not approve the drug for the off-label use because it finds that 
the research does not support a finding of safety and efficacy, however, then 
requiring the manufacturer to fund clinical research could potentially be a 
meaningless exercise. In that situation, it is possible that there is not a lack of 
clinical research. Instead, there is a misrepresentation of the research. When the 
true harm is a misrepresentation of clinical research rather than a lack of research, a 
remedy that requires research does little to address the harm or prevent future 
misconduct. On the other hand, it could be the case that the initial research is 
simply not adequate for the FDA to make a finding of safety and efficacy. 
Certainly, there have been cases in the past where the FDA has not approved a drug 
for safety reasons only to approve that drug a few years later after additional 
research.279 If the research is inadequate, then requiring the manufacturer to fund 
the research could aid the public by providing it with crucial information regarding 
drug safety. 
Although this remedy addresses the lack of clinical research, its effectiveness as 
a deterrent may vary based on when the manufacturer is caught promoting its drugs 
for off-label uses. If the drug is early in its patent period, then requiring clinical 
research may not be that harmful to the manufacturer’s bottom line. In the event 
that the research demonstrates that the product is safe for off-label use, the 
manufacturer will apply to the FDA to make the off-label use an approved use and 
will have the time and opportunity to recoup the cost of the trials because of the 
larger market for its product. Indeed, the profits from the additional use may far 
eclipse the cost of the research. Even if the research demonstrates that the drug is 
not safe for the off-label use, the manufacturer may be able to compensate for the 
loss if the drug is a blockbuster drug and continues to have high sales. Because of 
the complicated pricing structures for pharmaceutical drugs,280 the manufacturer 
will probably be able to pass the costs on to the consumer.  
Conversely, if it is late in the patent period, the manufacturer may not be the 
sole beneficiary of learning that the drug is safe for off-label uses. Instead, generic 
manufacturers may reap some benefits from that finding as they enter the market to 
produce the drug when it goes off patent. There may be some ability, however, to 
recoup the research costs if the FDA grants approval for the new use. In those 
situations, the manufacturer may be able to get an additional time period to prevent 
generic manufacturers from entering the market, termed “market exclusivity,” for a 
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period of three years.281 On the other hand, if the research shows that the drug is 
unsafe for the off-label use, the manufacturer will not have the opportunity to 
recoup the cost of the drug trial. Thus, the remedy would be most effective as a 
deterrent late in the patent period regardless of whether the drug is ultimately 
proven safe because the manufacturer will have very little, if any, time to recover 
the costs of the clinical trial.  
One could also argue, however, that funding clinical research will be an 
effective deterrent in all cases because the manufacturer will not know ahead of 
time whether the illegal activities will be discovered early or late in the patent 
period. As such, the manufacturer will want to avoid the substantial costs involved 
in conducting clinical research for the off-label uses. The best way to avoid those 
costs will be to vigorously monitor employees to make sure that they are not 
engaging in off-label promotion. The incentive to monitor, however, may be low in 
the beginning of the patent period, where any additional research costs could 
potentially be passed on to the consumer. As the patent nears its expiration date, 
however, the incentive to monitor rises because of the manufacturer’s inability to 
recoup the full research costs if required to perform additional clinical research. 
Thus, manufacturers may be more lenient on offending employees at the beginning 
of the patent period than at the end of the period.  
Despite the potential positive impact of the clinical research remedy, there is the 
possibility that it could lead to gamesmanship on the part of pharmaceutical 
companies. Pharmaceutical manufacturers will want to extend their monopoly for 
as long as possible. Thus, their employment of strategies to delay generic entry may 
increase due to this remedy and the resultant cost to the manufacturer. Although a 
discussion of these strategies is beyond the scope of this Article,282 their use could 
lead to increased profits for the pharmaceutical companies and higher drug costs for 
consumers because of the delay in availability of generic drugs. While consumers 
will suffer due to increased costs, there is no consumer benefit to offset the costs.  
On balance, requiring pharmaceutical manufacturers to fund additional clinical 
research on their drugs will lead to a more informed public and will encourage 
manufacturers to monitor their employees more carefully. Although the incentives 
to monitor may go up and down throughout the patent period, it is likely to be an 
effective deterrent due to the high cost associated with additional research—likely 
hundreds of millions of dollars—that the manufacturer may not be able to recoup.  
B. Compulsory Licensing 
Another way to look at the harm from off-label promotion is that it constitutes 
unjust enrichment to the manufacturer because the manufacturer is able to profit 
                                                                                                                 
 
 281. A Primer: Generic Drugs, Patents and the Pharmaceutical Marketplace, NAT’L 
INST. FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT. FOUND. 4–5 (June, 2002), http://www.nihcm.org/pdf/ 
GenericsPrimer.pdf. 
 282. See, e.g., Stacey B. Lee, Is a Cure on the Way?—The Bad Medicine of Generics, 
Citizen Petitions, and Noerr-Pennington Immunity, 20 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 98, 107–08 
(2010). See generally FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT 
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from an unapproved use for a drug. One way the government can recover the gain 
is by taking away the future profit potential of the drug. The key to pharmaceutical 
profit is patent protection. A patent gives a pharmaceutical manufacturer complete 
control over the pricing, production, and sale of a given drug during the patent 
period.283 In the pharmaceutical industry, patents are granted to spur future 
innovation and to generate new and improved medicines that will benefit the 
public.284 The patent offsets the cost of innovation and the risks involved in 
developing a new drug because it prevents competitors from imitating and 
producing the drug during the patent period.285 But patents only exist through 
congressional enactment.286 Thus, the government could restrict the patent rights of 
an offending drug company by granting a compulsory license. A compulsory 
license would require the drug maker to permit another manufacturer to produce 
and sell the patented drug for a pre-established fee or, because the license is a 
penalty, no fee at all.287  
Compulsory licenses have been used as a remedy in the antitrust context for 
anticompetitive behavior.288 Some federal statutes provide for compulsory 
licensing.289 They have also been proposed as a solution to the problem of high 
drug costs.290 In addition, the Bayh-Dole Act gives the government the power to 
compel a license if the patented invention was federally funded.291 As a remedy in 
an off-label promotion case, the compulsory license essentially takes away the 
profit potential of a patented drug because the patent owner is forced to grant a 
license for a rate that the government judges to be “reasonable” rather than a rate 
that would compensate the manufacturer for lost profits.292  
                                                                                                                 
 
 283. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) (“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to 
sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United 
States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.”). 
 284. Samuel Mark Borowski, Saving Tomorrow from Today: Preserving Innovation in 
the Face of Compulsory Licensing, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 275, 284 (2009) (“[The] incentive 
to innovate and invent is a function of four interrelated variables: (1) the costs of innovation 
and invention, (2) the risks, (3) the rewards for success, and (4) the rate at which competitive 
imitation occurs.”). 
 285. See id. at 284–86. 
 286. The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to “promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 287. Fauver, supra note 266, at 667 (“Compulsory licensing enables the government 
granting the patent to force the patentee to license the invention if the government does not 
approve of the patent’s use. Consequently, another individual or company is allowed to 
make and sell the invention.”); Alan M. Fisch, Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceutical 
Patents: An Unreasonable Solution to an Unfortunate Problem, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 295, 300 
(1994).  
 288. Fauver, supra note 266, at 670.  
 289. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2006); Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
2183. 
 290. Tanner, supra note 266, at 267. 
 291. Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–12. 
 292. Fisch, supra note 287, at 300 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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A compulsory license would revoke the manufacturer’s monopoly and thereby 
greatly reduce profitability. Thus, it provides a strong disincentive to violate off-
label prohibitions, as the gap between monopoly pricing (as the owner of the 
patent) and competitive pricing (as a licensor) is very large.293 It would also likely 
encourage vigorous monitoring of employees. Unlike in the clinical research 
context, the incentive to monitor may be higher during the beginning of the patent 
period and lower at the end of the patent period. This runs counter to the normal 
marketing practices of pharmaceutical companies to try to make the market for the 
drug as large as possible in the early patent period to ensure blockbuster status and 
high profits. It is the attempt to increase the market size that often leads to off-label 
promotion. Thus, in addition to monitoring, the remedy of compulsory licensing 
may require pharmaceutical companies to make some reforms to change their 
incentive structures.  
There are, however, some potential problems with this remedy. First, 
compulsory licensing might stifle innovation.294 Manufacturers may be unwilling to 
risk making a substantial investment in drug development if the reward from that 
investment can be taken away as a remedy for illegal marketing practices. Even 
with a serious monitoring program, there is no guarantee that an employee would 
not promote the drug for off-label uses leading to liability in the form of licensing 
of the patent for the corporation. Without a guarantee of the patent benefits, some 
manufacturers may choose not to invest in research and development. As a result, 
society would lose out on potentially life-saving drugs. Second, it might overdeter 
manufacturers. Because manufacturers would risk the loss of their patent rights, 
manufacturers may be overzealous in monitoring their employees. It may even 
deter manufacturers from conducting additional research on approved drugs for fear 
that some of their salespeople will begin to inform doctors of the new findings. 
Third, if the manufacturer is not the patent holder, it may be difficult for the 
government to craft the compulsory license to punish the manufacturer without 
harming the patent holder. Finally, Congress may have difficulty mustering the 
political will to authorize this type of remedy. The pharmaceutical lobby would 
vehemently oppose compulsory licensing of its products as a remedy for health 
care fraud.  
Despite the challenges that may exist for the use of compulsory licenses, it is 
hard to deny that their use would substantially raise the stakes for manufacturers. If 
a CIA is the first line of defense, but manufacturers know that a repeat offense will 
result in a compulsory license, the manufacturer will be less likely to become a 
repeat offender. Ultimately, the success of compulsory licenses as a sanction will 
depend on the government’s willingness to impose the remedy on a repeat offender. 
If the government were willing to make an example out of one manufacturer, other 
manufacturers would be on notice that compulsory licenses are a plausible remedy 
and would curb their illegal marketing practices to avoid that sanction.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 293. See Charles E. Mueller, Sources of Monopoly Power: A Phenomenon Called 
‘Product Differentiation,’ 18 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 2–5 (1968).  
 294. See, e.g., Glover Statement, supra note 33, at 6 (“[C]ompanies would not be able to 
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C. Corporate Officer Liability 
The harm in off-label promotions may be that the pharmaceutical companies 
have defrauded the government. If the main goal of criminal prosecution of 
corporations is to encourage monitoring of lower level employees, then one 
possibility is to pursue corporate officers criminally. Although responsibility for 
illegal promotional activities is often scattered throughout an organization, it may 
be possible for the government to pursue responsible corporate officers. This type 
of strategy allows the government to put a face on the fraud. Indeed, the FDA 
recently called for more prosecutions of responsible corporate officers under the 
FDCA.295  
Under the responsible corporate officer (RCO) doctrine, officers are subject to 
both criminal and civil liability for corporate violations of statutes involving public 
welfare offenses, such as health care fraud.296 The RCO doctrine provides that a 
defendant may be guilty if he or she had, “by reason of his [or her] position in the 
corporation, responsibility and authority either to prevent in the first instance, or 
                                                                                                                 
 
 295. See Letter from Margaret Hamburg, FDA Comm’r, to the Honorable Charles E. 
Grassley, Ranking Member of the Senate Fin. Comm. 2 (Mar. 4, 2010), available at 
http://grassley.senate.gov/about/upload/FDA-3-4-10-Hamburg-letter-to-Grassley-re-GAO-
report-on-OCI.pdf. The FDA commissioner explained: 
A third recommendation from the committee was to increase the appropriate 
use of misdemeanor prosecutions, a valuable enforcement tool, to hold 
responsible corporate officials accountable. Criteria now have been developed 
for consideration in selection of misdemeanor prosecution cases and will be 
incorporated into the revised policies and procedures that cover appropriate use 
of misdemeanor prosecutions.  
Id. 
 296. The U.S. Supreme Court first articulated the RCO doctrine in United States v. 
Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943). In Dotterweich, the Court upheld the conviction of a drug 
company’s president and general manager for the company’s shipping of misbranded and 
adulterated drugs in interstate commerce. Id. at 278, 285. The employees had repackaged 
drugs from the manufacturer and shipped them out to fulfill a doctor’s order. Id. at 278. 
Although the Court acknowledged the hardship on individuals whose “consciousness of 
wrongdoing be totally wanting” but found it necessary to protect the public from the hazard 
of misbranded and adulterated drugs. Id. at 284. In 1975, the Supreme Court once again 
approved the application of liability under the RCO doctrine in United States v. Park, 421 
U.S. 658 (1975). In Park, the Court affirmed the conviction of a president of a national food 
chain whose warehouses were suffering from a rat infestation. Id. at 661. As a result of the 
infestation, the food became contaminated. Id. at 662. The president had delegated 
warehouse operations to subordinates. Id. at 663. Although someone had notified Park of 
unsanitary conditions at another warehouse, and he instructed his subordinates to take 
corrective actions, Park had no personal knowledge of unsanitary conditions at the 
warehouse in question. See id. at 664–65. The Court explained:  
The requirements of foresight and vigilance imposed on responsible corporate 
agents are beyond question demanding, and perhaps onerous, but they are no 
more stringent than the public has a right to expect of those who voluntarily 
assume positions of authority in business enterprises whose services and 
products affect the health and well-being of the public that supports them.  
Id. at 672.  
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promptly to correct,” the alleged violations of law.297 Thus, the individual need not 
have directly participated in the criminal conduct for liability to attach under the 
RCO doctrine. Instead, the burden is put on an individual “otherwise innocent but 
standing in responsible relation to a public danger.”298 The U.S. Supreme Court 
has, however, recognized an impossibility defense when the defendant was 
“powerless to prevent or correct the violation.”299 Thus, there needs to be some 
level of “blameworthiness” for the doctrine to be imposed, but the Supreme Court 
has not been clear on the threshold requirement for responsibility.300 The DOJ 
would most likely use the RCO doctrine to charge high-ranking individuals of 
pharmaceutical manufacturers with misdemeanor misbranding violations under the 
FDCA because of the lack of an intent requirement for that crime. If the individuals 
are found guilty, they could face imprisonment, criminal fines, and exclusion from 
Medicare and Medicaid.301  
The biggest concern with employing the RCO doctrine is that individuals who 
are not culpable in the traditional sense may be punished with substantial fines and 
exclusion from federal health care programs. If sticking with a purely utilitarian 
justification for punishment, then it is sometimes justifiable to punish the innocent 
if the benefit to society outweighs the harm.302 It is not clear that is the case here. 
The government would essentially be using these prosecutions to make examples 
out of high-level officials in the company. But this sends a bad message to 
individuals within the health care industry. It is one thing to structure enforcement 
of the laws to encourage supervision and monitoring and to penalize the 
corporation for its failure to do so. It is another thing to single out executives who 
did not have a hand in the wrongdoing for punishment based, in large part, on their 
positions in the company. The government would likely argue, however, that 
prosecuting executives who fail to prevent or correct illegal conduct is “no more 
stringent [a standard] than the public has a right to expect of those who voluntarily 
assume positions of authority in business enterprises whose services and products 
affect the health and well-being of the public that supports them.”303 That reasoning 
probably holds true in an egregious case where the executive turns a blind eye to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 297. Park, 421 U.S. at 673–74.  
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 301. As the law currently stands, OIG may exclude an executive of a convicted 
corporation from Medicare and Medicaid, but if the executive resigned from the corporation 
before conviction, he or she could escape exclusion. 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7(b)(15) (2006) 
(referring to an individual “who is an officer or managing employee” (emphasis added)). 
Thus, U.S. Representative Pete Stark recently introduced bipartisan legislation that would 
close this loophole and allow OIG to pursue exclusion of executives that have left their 
companies. See Strengthening Medicaid Anti-Fraud Measures Act of 2010, H.R. 6130, 111th 
Cong. (2010), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_ 
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 302. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 223, at 454. 
 303. Park, 421 U.S. at 672. 
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misconduct. If the employees are hiding the misconduct, however, it is hard to 
understand how society benefits from using the moral condemnation of the criminal 
law against the executive rather than the employee.  
Although the Supreme Court did indicate the need for some “blameworthiness” 
on the part of the prosecuted individual, it is not clear how stringently the FDA will 
apply this requirement. The FDA recently amended its Regulatory Procedures 
Manual to instruct FDA personnel to consider “the individual’s position in the 
company and relationship to the violation, and whether the official had the 
authority to correct or prevent the violation.”304 But that is nothing more than a 
recitation of the standard the Supreme Court set forth in Park and Dotterweich. The 
Regulatory Procedures Manual also sets forth seven factors for FDA personnel to 
consider, including (1) whether the violation harmed or could harm the public; (2) 
“[w]hether the violation is obvious”; (3) whether the violation is part of a pattern of 
misconduct; (4) “[w]hether the violation is widespread”; (5) the seriousness of the 
violation; (6) the quality of the evidence in support of the prosecution; and (7) 
whether the prosecution is a good use of agency resources.305 With respect to 
blameworthiness, one could certainly argue that if a violation is obvious, serious, 
widespread, and part of a pattern of misconduct, then the executive in charge is at 
fault for not identifying and correcting the misconduct. But, as the FDA notes in its 
Regulatory Procedures Manual, “it would be futile to attempt to define or indicate 
by way of illustration either the categories of persons that may bear a responsible 
relationship to a violation or the types of conduct that may be viewed as causing or 
contributing to a violation of the Act.”306 Thus, the guidance is not a guarantee that 
the FDA will use the RCO doctrine sparingly or only in the most egregious 
circumstances. After its success prosecuting Purdue Pharma executives under the 
RCO doctrine,307 it is possible that the FDA will shift its enforcement strategy to 
prosecuting individuals. If the FDA begins to use the RCO doctrine aggressively, it 
may discourage talented compliance professionals or other executives from 
working for large health care companies for fear that they will be held criminally 
liable for millions of dollars or excluded from participation in Medicare or 
Medicaid, which would make them unemployable in the health care industry.308  
                                                                                                                 
 
 304. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL, SPECIAL PROCEDURES 
AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR PARK DOCTRINE PROSECUTIONS § 6-5-3 (2011), available at 
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One way to address the potential criticism of the RCO doctrine on fairness 
grounds is to only use it to pursue officers of a repeat offender. Thus, it may be 
appropriate to use a CIA and require upper management to make certifications of 
compliance the first time that a drug maker runs afoul of the law. If a manufacturer 
that is subject to a CIA, or a recently expired CIA, is under investigation for further 
marketing violations, the government could pursue the individuals who were 
responsible for making certifications under the previous CIA. Because those 
individuals would understand that they could be held personally liable for failing to 
monitor their employees, they would have a very high incentive to diligently 
oversee the marketing activities of their subordinates.   
The question, however, is whether punishing individuals within the company 
would be a more effective deterrent than pursuing the corporation. Although some 
may argue that prosecution of individuals is more likely to deter corporate actors 
than prosecution of corporations, scholars such as Professor Geraldine Szott Moohr 
have argued that corporate crime does not occur simply because of the “ethical and 
moral lapses of executives and employees.”309 The fact is that pharmaceutical 
manufacturers can encourage illegal conduct through the policies that they 
employ.310 For example, the incentive structure for pharmaceutical sales 
representatives encourages them to engage in off-label promotional activities. A 
sales representative is incentivized by the number of calls, that is, drug detailing 
visits to a physician, and by the number of prescriptions written by that physician 
and filled by a pharmacy. “In a standard [drug] detailing session, a rep[resentative] 
generally describes a drug’s approved uses and provides an overview of the safety 
profile.”311 Because a representative details numerous physicians, the representative 
often collects anecdotal evidence of how doctors are prescribing products for 
additional indications. Representatives then share that information with clients even 
if it deviates from the approved detail for the product because it may expand the 
product uses and increase the likelihood of prescription, thus adding to the 
representative’s income.312 Ethical drug promotion requires vigilance from the 
company and financial remuneration that does not encourage these practices.313  
Even if deterrence is better served by prosecuting corporations, the reality is that 
the government is not going to prosecute the company because of its concern of 
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harming innocent individuals. Thus, the advantage to the use of the RCO doctrine 
is that there will be criminal responsibility for the illegal conduct.  
D. Targeted Exclusion 
If the harm from off-label promotion is that the government and the public have 
been defrauded, then some form of exclusion may be needed to protect the 
government and the public from the unscrupulous manufacturer. Congress could 
amend the Social Security Act to provide a new exclusion remedy for use against 
pharmaceutical companies.314 In particular, if a pharmaceutical company is 
convicted of fraud due to its promotion of a drug for off-label uses or the payment 
of kickbacks, the Social Security Act should permit HHS to exclude the improperly 
promoted drug from the federal health care programs. If, for example, Pfizer were 
convicted of fraud in connection with marketing Bextra for off-label uses, Bextra 
would be excluded from reimbursement under the federal health care programs. As 
a result, the Medicare and Medicaid programs would not reimburse patients for 
Bextra prescriptions but would reimburse for all other Pfizer drugs. 
To avoid the resultant harm to patients who use the excluded drug, however, the 
Social Security Act would also need to be amended to require the manufacturer to 
cover the cost of the excluded drug for Medicare and Medicaid patients who have 
prescriptions for that drug. This is necessary to prevent an interruption in treatment 
for innocent patients. Once a patient has found a drug that works well for the 
treatment of a disease, the patient should not have to become a guinea pig for other 
medications simply because the drug manufacturer engaged in misconduct.  
A targeted exclusion remedy is likely to deter drug manufacturers more than the 
continued use of CIAs because the higher likelihood of enforcement will force drug 
manufacturers to reevaluate the potential penalty that they will face upon detection 
of the fraud. The penalty will include: the fine imposed as a result of violating the 
FCA and FDCA; the loss of Medicare and Medicaid revenue from the excluded 
drug over the five-year exclusion period; and the cost of providing the excluded 
drug free of charge to Medicare and Medicaid patients for the five-year exclusion 
period. The addition of the requirement that manufacturers provide the excluded 
drug to Medicare and Medicaid patients is warranted because the added benefit it 
brings—reduction of harm to innocent patients—outweighs the harm that it 
imposes on the culpable manufacturer. After reevaluating the penalty to be 
imposed, pharmaceutical manufacturers should reach the conclusion that the 
increased profit to be gained from off-label promotion would be outweighed by the 
cost of the fine and the five-year exclusion of the improperly promoted drug.  
Unlike the current exclusion remedy, there is little deterrence spillover onto 
innocent employees and patients. Although the exclusion of an improperly 
marketed drug from reimbursement under Medicare and Medicaid would cut off a 
significant source of revenue for a pharmaceutical company, it would not be nearly 
as devastating to the company, its employees, and patients as blanket exclusion. 
The likelihood of the manufacturer collapsing is dramatically lower than with 
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blanket exclusion. Further, the manufacturer would not need to engage in a cost-
cutting campaign to compensate for a huge reduction in revenue. Admittedly, as 
with any fine, the cost may be passed onto consumers in the form of higher drug 
prices. Because the remedy is targeted squarely at the manufacturer that caused the 
harm, however, there is a greater likelihood that the government will be willing to 
enforce the remedy.  
A targeted exclusion remedy would give the government a credible remedy to 
use against pharmaceutical manufacturers that engage in health care fraud and 
abuse. The government would no longer need to make the empty threat of blanket 
exclusion. Ultimately, however, the deterrent effect of a targeted exclusion remedy 
would largely depend on whether the government is willing to change its 
enforcement strategy from repeated use of CIAs to the use of both CIAs (when 
appropriate) and targeted exclusion. If the government decides that its first strategy 
is to pursue reform through a CIA, it must be willing to go after the manufacturer 
and seek exclusion if the manufacturer violates the CIA by engaging in improper 
promotion during the period of the CIA. Otherwise, the targeted exclusion remedy, 
just like the blanket exclusion remedy, will underdeter pharmaceutical 
manufacturers.  
One of the biggest costs of targeted exclusion will be that the government likely 
will spend money administering and/or supervising the pharmaceutical company’s 
fulfillment of the requirement of covering the cost of the excluded drug for 
Medicare and Medicaid patients. There could be great difficulty in compiling a list 
of Medicare and Medicaid patients who would be eligible for the excluded drug at 
no cost. The list also would require constant updates as new Medicare and 
Medicaid patients obtain prescriptions for the excluded drug. In addition, unlike 
CIAs where manufacturers bear the cost of monitoring, here the government would 
incur the cost either because the government is administering the fund or because it 
is supervising the manufacturer’s administration of the fund. 
Perhaps this proposal would increase the number of cases that actually go to 
court, thus placing more of a burden on the judicial system. But the upside would 
be that the administration of justice would be furthered. Prosecutors would be 
forced to test their legal theories (misbranding, introduction of a new drug, etc.) 
regarding off-label promotion, and the adjudication of these cases will clarify the 
law of off-label promotion. Thus, instead of simply having guidance documents 
from the FDA on what will or will not violate the laws prohibiting off-label 
marketing, we will have definitive opinions from the courts interpreting the FDCA. 
Importantly, in addition to clarifying the law, targeted exclusion would prevent the 
exclusion remedy from being circumvented. Prosecutors would not have to agree to 
exclude a subsidiary to prevent the exclusion from having an adverse impact on the 
manufacturer. Instead, the illegally marketed drug would be excluded, which would 
be more in line with the statutory purpose. 
CONCLUSION 
The current approach of using Corporate Integrity Agreements as a 
one-size-fits-all solution to health care fraud is not sustainable. The large penalties 
and CIA-demanded reforms that are intended to deter manufacturers from 
re-engaging in illegal promotional practices have become nothing more than the 
1086 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 87:1033 
 
cost of doing business. Pharmaceutical manufacturers have all too often returned to 
their pre-CIA illegal promotional activities because they know that the government 
will not harm innocent third parties by imposing blanket exclusions. Thus, CIAs 
underdeter manufacturers because the government does not have a plausible 
remedy of increasing severity to impose in the event that the manufacturer violates 
the CIA. Therefore, the government needs to consider alternative remedies to CIAs 
that could be used for repeat offenders of the marketing rules. Each of the remedies 
discussed in this Article—funding clinical trials, compulsory licensing, corporate 
officer liability, and targeted exclusion—could be used to increase the severity of 
punishment if a manufacturer violates a CIA. The government would need to weigh 
the costs and benefits of the various alternatives before deciding which sanction 
would be most appropriate given the circumstances of the offender and the offense. 
The ultimate choice among the alternatives matters little. The important thing is 
that the government raises the stakes for pharmaceutical manufacturers so that they 
will think twice before violating an existing CIA. This change of course is 
necessary if the government is serious about enforcing integrity in drug promotion. 
